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ABSTRACT
This article explores the attempts by international states and
organizations to create a global legal whaling regime and examines its
underlying competing environmental norms of exploitation, conserva-
tion, and preservation. It outlines a history of whaling exploitation over
the centuries and tracks the development of early whaling regimes, as
well as examines the development of the International Whaling Commis-
sion and treaty. Legro's test of the robustness of a norm is applied to the
whaling regime to determine when, why, and through whose agency
normative change was effected within the Commission.
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INTRODUCTION
The fight by Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations
("ENGOs") to preserve whales is considered to be the first modern, global
environmental campaign, and in many ways the whale is still regarded
as the symbol of the ENGO trans-national movement.' Environmental-
ists often cite this campaign as a model of how to achieve environmental
goals.2 Yet these claims belie a more complex history, characterized by
a morass of competing interests and positions regarding the killing of
whales, that continues to this day.3 This article will examine the modern
exploitation of whales and the competing attempts by various normative
entrepreneurs to introduce their preferred competing environmental norms
of exploitation, conservation, or preservation. The arena of normative con-
testation to be examined is the meetings to regulate the whaling industry
held primarily under the auspices of the International Whaling Commission
("IWC"), as well as other forums held to regulate the practice of whaling.
This paper focuses on the case study of whaling because it is a less
clear-cut example of normative change, which reveals much of the under-
lying positioning of various norm proponents to promote their preferred
position. Initially, the exploitation of whale species to the brink of extinc-
tion led to a push by whaling states and companies for a conservationist
regime under the IWC to be put in place.4 The failure of whalers to adhere
to a conservationist approach opened the door for anti-whaling states
and ENGOs to propose and promote a preservationist approach to global
whale stocks that still underpins the IWC today, despite a fierce back-
lash from whaling states that threatens to tear the organization apart.5
' Niels Einarsson, All Animals Are Equal but Some Are Cetaceans: Conservation and
Culture Conflict, in ENVIRONMENTALISM: THE VIEW FROM ANTHROPOLOGY 73, 75 (Kay
Milton ed., 1993); Paul Wapner, Horizontal Politics: TransnationalEnvironmentalActivism
and Global Cultural Change, GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., May 2002, at 37, 48.
2 See Paul Wapner, Politics Beyond the State: Environmental Activism and World Civic
Politics, 47 WORLD POL. 311, 320 (1995).
' See Wapner, supra note 1.4 M.J. Peterson, Whalers, Cetologists, Environmentalism and the International Management
of Whaling, 46 INT'L ORG. 147, 147 (1992).
'See William C.G. Burns, The Berlin Initiative on Strengthening the Conservation Agenda
of the International Whaling Commission: Toward a New Era for Cetaceans?, 13 REV. OF
EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L. 72, 73-74 (2004); Charlotte Epstein, The Making of
Global Environmental Norms: Endangered Species Protection, GLOBAL ENvTL. POL., May
2006, at 32, 45.
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I. DEFINING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL NORMS
This paper analyzes global moral norms in international environ-
mental agreements, how they evolve, the role of norm advocates, and how
norms become accepted by the global community. In particular, this paper
will focus on the environmental norms of exploitation, conservation, and
preservation. However, before examining their role in changing regimes,
the role played by norms in international regimes needs to be understood.
Norms can be defined for the purposes of this article as "shared expecta-
tions about appropriate behavior held by a collectivity of actors."6 At the
global level, norms can be found operating in international regimes of all
persuasions, and the development of a more nuanced understanding of
their functions has provided a clearer picture of how regimes evolve.7
Stephen Krasner originally defined regimes as "sets of implicit or explicit
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which
actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations."'
Robert Keohane, building on the earlier work of John Ruggie and Ernst
Haas, has argued that within a regime
Norms contain somewhat clearer injunctions to members
about legitimate and illegitimate behaviour, still defining re-
sponsibilities and obligations in relatively general terms....
The rules of a regime are difficult to distinguish from its
norms; at the margin, they merge into one another. Rules
are, however, more specific: they indicate in more detail the
specific rights and obligations of members.9
6 Jeffrey T. Checkel, Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe,
43 INT'L STUD. Q. 83, 83 (1999).
'See Robert O. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, 36 INT'L ORG. 325,325-
26 (1982).
8 Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences, in INTERNATIONAL
REGIMES, 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983). The regime definition promulgated by
Krasner is not without its detractors. O'Riordan et al. are critical of the distinction in
that it "is rather broad and ambiguous in delimiting whether phenomena fall under the
rubric of international regimes in empirical research. It includes both formal governmental
organizations (such as the various UN agencies) and regularized forms of policy coordi-
nation on a specific issue." Ian H. Rowlands, Classical Theories of International Relations,
in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 43, 55 (Urs Luterbacher &
DetlefF. Sprinz eds., 2001) (quoting O'Riordan et al., Institutional Frameworks forPolitical
Action, in HUMAN CHOICE AND CLIMATE CHANGE 345, 361 (Steve Rayner & Elizabeth L.
Malone eds., 1998)).
9 ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD
POLITICAL ECONOMY 58 (1984).
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Norms function within regimes in a number of ways. They can
provide a basis for shaming or pressuring actors, or they can provide the
basis of social learning of appropriate or moral behavior and become in-
ternalized by agents and guide actions.1 ° As R. Charli Carpenter argues,
"norms provide an intersubjective context in which discourse and be-
havior are interpreted and either condoned or condemned by third parties.
As general standards, norms are codified and (sometimes) implemented
in the form. of specific rules, which actors then chose to obey, break, or re-
define."" Norms in one sense are counterfactual since the mere violation
of a norm does not necessarily disprove its existence or its impact; much
depends on the response to violations. 2 However, norms are not "causes"
for behavior but they can serve as reasons for behavior, providing a com-
ponent of the essential deliberative process of making choices. 3 At the
international level such norms are often codified within international law,
which provides an important indicator of the presence and strength of a
global norm. 4 When states make agreements, the benefits that accrue
from normative compliance may not necessarily be material, but may
include the need for legitimacy, credibility, status, or a concern to be per-
ceived as a good global citizen. 5
Although descriptions and evaluations of norms in environmental
literature proliferate, studies as to why people adhere to particular norms
are rare. Even in strategic studies of norms, little analysis has been car-
ried out on the dynamics of norm articulation and internalization and
"how [norms] can get started, how a partial norm can be sustained and
'
0 Jeffrey T. Checkel, International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist-
Constructivist Divide, 3 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 473, 474-75 (2003).
" R. Charli Carpenter, 'Women and Children First'. Gender, Norms, and Humanitarian
Evacuation in the Balkans 1991-95, 57 INT'L ORG. 661, 670 (2003).12 Radoslav S. Dimitrov, Hostage to Norms: States, Institutions and Global Forest Politics,
5 GLOBAL ENvTL. POL., Nov. 2005, at 1, 12.
"3 Friedrich Kratochwil, Thrasymmachos Revisited: On the Relevance of Norms and the
Study of Law for International Relations, J. INT'L AFF., Spring 1984, at 343, 356.14 Within international law, we can speak of a hierarchy of norms when it comes to examin-
ing the efficacy and durability of a norm: international treaties; customary international
law; general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; judicial decisions and; teach-
ings of the most highly qualified proponents of the various states. HENNING BOEKLE,
VOLKER R=ITBERGER & WOLFGANG WAGNER, NORMS AND FOREIGN POLICY: CONSTRUCTIvIST
FOREIGN POLICY THEORY 20 (1999), available at http://www.uni-tuebingen.de/uni/spi/
taps/tap34a.htm.
5 See Petrice R. Flowers, International Norms and Domestic Policies in Japan: Identity,
Legitimacy and Civilization 4 (Aug. 2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Minnesota).
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become well established and how one norm can displace another."16 As
Jeffrey Legro argues, "The literature on norms has generally misspecified
their impact because of several conceptual and methodological biases...
by concentrating on showing that norms 'matter,' analysts have given
short shrift to the critical issues of which norms matter, the ways they
matter, and how much they matter relative to other factors." 7
Legro posits that analysts, whatever their theoretical persuasion,
have at least two biases relevant to the study undertaken here, which has
rendered their analysis flawed."8 The first bias is an inability to perceive
"norm robustness" as an independent variable, separate from the effects
attributed to the norm.' 9 There is such a plethora of norms competing in
the international arena that one can always "discover" a norm to explain
an effect cited. It is crucial, therefore, to be able to understand why some
norms are more influential than others in a particular forum. The second
bias is that most analysis to date focuses on norms perceived to have
"worked" rather than examining case studies where norms have failed to
find purchase and have failed to be accepted.2" To better understand the
influence of norms in the global community, it is also necessary to study
cases of the success, failure and obsolescence of norms. As Legro correctly
argues, "Why norms did not emerge or were not consequential is as im-
portant as why they did or were."2'
This article responds to these criticisms by Legro by seeking to
discover which of the environmental norms of exploitation, conservation,
and preservation "won," or at least predominated, in a given situation of
normative contestation and why. This entails exploring how much rival
norms have played a critical role within negotiations to create environ-
mental regimes, and when and how normative transformation was brought
about. It will ask how much the successful norm has mattered relative
to other norms and material factors and will also examine cases of norm
failure, where "progressive" environmental norms such as conservation
and preservation were unsuccessful, such as the case of tropical timber
where conservation has failed to supplant exploitation.
16 ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: AGENT-BASED MODELS OF
COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION 56 (1997).
"7 Jeffrey W. Legro, Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the "Failure" of Internationalism,
51 INTL ORG. 31, 31 (1997).
8 See id. at 33.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 34.21 d .
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Unlike much of the research into norm behavior, this article is
primarily concerned then with analyzing competing norms. As Robert
Jackson argues, "the international sphere, like most spheres of human
conduct, is fraught with normative tensions, anomalies and conflicts," but
they are rarely directly analyzed because they are either seen as irrelevant
by neorealists describing them as "epiphenomena" or are seen as a subset
of the main game, such as actors' interests, by neoliberal institutional-
ists.22 Before engaging with the research questions posed, it is necessary
to gain an understanding of the philosophical and practical distinctions
between the competing three norms under scrutiny: exploitation, conser-
vation, and preservation.
Further, to better understand competing normative development,
Jeffrey Legro's test for the robustness of a norm will be employed.23 This
paper will compare and contrast three competing norms within the one
environmental regime to see which has emerged as the more robust norm
over time and why. Legro is rightly critical of the constructivist approach
to normative analysis, arguing that to date such research mostly studies
one norm in isolation and has not focused on cases where norms compete,
nor has it investigated cases of normative failure.24 Legro's work enables
us to examine more sharply the evolution of norms and to determine their
relative robustness. Legro proposes a three-pronged test to determine the
strength of a particular norm: "specificity, durability, and concordance.""
A norm's strength can be judged on its specificity or "how precisely
a norm distinguishes appropriate from inappropriate behavior."26 In other
words, the specificity prong of Legro's test judges "how well the guidelines
for restraint and use are defined and understood."27 Are they overly complex
and ill-defined, or simple and precise? This is "assessed by examining actors'
understandings of the simplicity and clarity of the prohibition."28 This pre-
cision depends to a great extent on the explication of the norm in such docu-
ments as written conventions. A non-specific standard of behavior means
that there could be a wide range of behavioral possibilities that could be de-
termined as appropriate and do not allow any straightforward assessment
22 ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASI-STATEs: SOvEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND THE
THIRD WORLD 172 (1990).
z See Legro, supra note 17, at 34.
See id.2 5 id.
26 BOEKLE, RITrBERGER & WAGNER, supra note 14, at 6.
27 Legro, supra note 17, at 34.
2 8 Id.
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of whether a norm has been violated. Such unspecified norms are "unsuit-
able as a standard for appropriate behaviour" and cannot be treated as an
independent variable that can explain a norm's efficacy.29
Legro goes on to look at how durable a norm can be by asking us
to demonstrate "how long the rules have been in effect and how they
weather challenges to their prohibitions."" Are violators and violations
of the norm penalized and in what way? The violation of a norm does not
necessarily mean that the norm has no validity. For example, the norm
against incest is a strong one despite there being repeated infractions of
the taboo. For Legro the point is that the actors are punished or censured,
either at a societal level or at a personal level where they sanction them-
selves for their transgressions.3
Lastly Legro examines the concept of concordance or commonal-
ity,32 that is, "how widely accepted the rules are in diplomatic discussions
and treaties (that is, the degree ofintersubjective agreement)."33 Do states
agree on the acceptance of the validity of a norm? Has it been internal-
ized? Do they put conditions on acceptance and therefore diminish it? Are
these rules so taken for granted that no actor even considers violating
them?34
The strength of the obligation inherent in a norm is determined
in these cases by the units within a system who share that norm's
values. Thus we can speak of a high degree of commonality if all actors
share a certain value-based expectation of behavior, a medium degree
if a majority of actors share the same expectation of behavior, and a
low degree of commonality if a minority ascribe to the expectation of
behavior. 35 According to Legro, a norm must have at least a medium
level of commonality before it can be said to be exerting any influence
on a state's behavior.36 This can be examined by evaluating records of
national and international discussions on particular norms as will be
done in this article. The expectation of this approach "is that the
29 BOEKLE, RITTBERGER & WAGNER, supra note 14, at 7.
30 Legro, supra note 17, at 34.
31 Id. at 35.
32 By commonality, constructivists mean "how many actors of a social system share a
value-based expectation of behavior." BOEKLE, R1TTBERGER, AND WAGNER, supra note 14,
at 7.
3 Legro, supra note 17, at 35.
34 See id.35 See BOEKLE, R1TrEERGER, AND WAGNER, supra note 14, at 6.
31 See Legro, supra note 17, at 35.
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clearer, more durable, and more widely endorsed a prescription is, the
greater will be its impact" and consequently its robustness. 37 The
greater the level of commonality, the more robust the explanation that
constructivism provides. The lower the commonality the greater the
likelihood that the expectation is not an independent variable but
rather some other variable. Analysts must demonstrate "that certain
groups assert themselves over their rivals because of the norms they
share" and only then will that norm be the explanatory variable.38
This paper will take up the challenge issued by Legro and, using
his test of norm robustness, seek to unpack the notion of normative com-
petition and transformation within the global whaling regime. It will
attempt to answer the following questions: How can we explain the ascen-
dancy of some environmental norms over others? In particular, how can
we explain the rise of, and resistance to, conservation and preservation
norms over exploitation norms in environmental regimes? To answer the
proposed questions this article will investigate the discursive fora and con-
texts through which the examined norms were negotiated as well as the
main whaling sub-issues still being debated today within the IWC. This
includes examining the proffered arguments put forward by actors and
the ideational frameworks utilized to defend positions. The strategies and
tactics employed to persuade and manipulate other actors are also ana-
lyzed along with a critical reading of the way the normative preferences
of the parties are transformed through social interaction.
II. THE NORMS OF EXPLOITATION, CONSERVATION, AND
PRESERVATION
All three environmental norms examined in this article started
as domestic norms but have become global due to the increasingly trans-
boundary character of environmental problems and the transnational
activism of ENGOs. Thus norms have histories that can be "subject to
change over time" as a "result of the communicative process in which
value-based expectations of behavior are socialized and as a result of
which the contents of socialization can change in the long term."39 The
global environmental norms examined here are not categorical; rather
37 Id.
BOEKLE, RITTBERGER, AND WAGNER, supra note 14, at 6.
3Id. at 10.
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they evolved over time in the language used by various norm advocates
to advance their cause.4 Such practices then determine the legitimacy of
global actors within social contexts.4
It is useful to begin with an examination of the norms of exploita-
tion, conservation, and preservation from a philosophical viewpoint before
embarking on an analysis of how such norms compete within environ-
mental regimes. This is not to say that there is one correct definition of the
terms examined. Advocates, as will be seen in the case study, use differing
and sometimes multiple definitions of norms to advance their cause.42
Many proponents mistakenly conflate the terms when defining their posi-
tions, and some advocates hide their real position within the rhetorical
definitions of another.43 However, offering conceptual distinctions based
on a long history of environmental philosophical engagement will help to
shed light on the varieties of ways in which the norms are deployed and/or
understood by social agents.
The concept of "exploitation" has received scant conceptual analysis
compared to the concepts of conservation and preservation.' One of the few
authors to explore the meaning of the general concept in any depth is Alan
Wertheimer, who argues that at the most general level, exploitation occurs
when "A takes unfair advantage of B" thus connoting a wrongful action.45
However, Wertheimer does not consider the exploitation of nature by
humans.46 Taylor, rather than defining exploitation per se, speaks in terms
of an exploitative attitude which he defines as occurring "whenever nature
is thought of as nothing more than a vast repository of resources, both
physical and biological, to be developed, used, and consumed by humans for
human ends."47
4 Christian Reus-Smit, The Politics of International Law, in THE POLITICS OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAw 14, 35 (Christian Reus-Smit ed., 2004).
41 See id.42 See infra Part X.
' For an example of conflation, see Birnie and Boyle who define conservation in preser-
vationist terms as "to keep in safety or from harm, decay or loss; to preserve in being; to
keep alive." P.W. BIRNIE AND A.E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT
550 (2d ed. 2002). While conservationist rhetoric about the need to save the environment
is standard, it would be a brave state or company that would argue in this day and age for
reckless exploitation of a resource to occur. Rather, the position is put that global resources
needs careful conserving or "wise use" to ensure there are resources available for future
generations of humans.
4See ALAN WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION 5 (1996).
45 Id. at 10.
4Id. at 10-12.47 PAuL W. TAYLOR, RESPECT FOR NATURE: A THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 95 (1986).
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Even in the ecophilosophical literature, the concept of exploitation
only has been cursorily explored as part of an overarching Western nar-
rative of historically dominating nature. Most ecophilosophical attention
has been devoted to the new environmental norms that have challenged
exploitation, namely conservation or preservation.4' Taylor argues that
for some, the advancement of western civilization is intricately bound up
with the domination of nature in pursuit of the goal of ensuring a better
life for the bulk of humanity.49 Alternatively, some ecophilosophers have
made the point that there is a conceptual link between the exploitation of
nature and the exploitation of disadvantaged groups within society, such
as women or indigenous peoples, but again the term is not spelled out but
rather is left undefined and generally understood as "bad."5 °
Humankind has traditionally attempted to portray and justify its
environmentally exploitative practices as beneficial to itself." For example,
Francis Bacon argued at one point that the dominion of the planet by man
gave him the right to utilize nature for "man's" benefit exclusively.52 Such
exploitation has been described as springing from the human belief that
there is an "inherent right to take and plunder" natural resources which
has been justified using the Christian Bible passage that God gave domin-
ion of the planet to humanity for its own uses.53
However, it is possible to perceive exploitation as a good if it is in
the service of a higher moral goal, such as the provision of a better quality
of life for the citizens of a state. Taylor argues that in human/ecology there
is nothing morally wrong with choosing an exploitative attitude towards
nature.5 4 Such non-respect towards nature is permissible since from a
human-centered ethical standpoint the environment is "rightly controlled,
transformed, and consumed in the service of human interests alone" and
"[a] side from their actual or potential usefulness to humans, they lack
all worth."55
48 WARWICK Fox, TOWARD A TRANSPERSONAL ECOLOGY: DEVELOPING NEW FOUNDATIONS
FOR ENVIRONMENTALISM 152-53 (1990).
49 TAYLOR, supra note 47.
o Robyn Ekersley, Politics, in A COMPANION TO ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 316, 321
(Dale Jamieson ed., 2003). For research on the link between nature, feminism, and indig-
enous peoples, see VAL PLUMWOOD, FEMINISM AND THE MASTERY OF NATURE (1990).
"1 Robin Attfield, Christianity, in A COMPANION TO ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 96,
104-05 (Dale Jamieson ed., 2001).52 Id. at 105.
M PETER G. BROWN, ETHICS, ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: TRANSPARENT
SOVEREIGNTY IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF LIFE 44 (2000).
5 TAYLOR, supra note 47, at 51-52.
55 Id. at 52.
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States have historically viewed their exploitation of natural re-
sources, both domestic and global, as a right and, in some cases, as a
good.56 Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration has enshrined this
internationally recognized right to the effect that "states have.., the
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own envi-
ronmental policies .... "" Exploitation of resources such as those exam-
ined in this article-minerals, whales or timber-has long been accepted
as a corollary of state sovereignty, and part of the principle of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources.5 "
Given the lack of definitional precision of the term exploitation as
it applies to nature, it is necessary to advance a working definition for the
purposes of this article that encapsulates the morally pejorative meaning
of the term as well as the morally non-pejorative sense of the unrestrained
use of natural resources. Consequently, the term will be understood, draw-
ing on the work of Taylor, as referring to a situation where humanity
treats resources as merely instruments to be developed and consumed
without consideration for the survivability of the resource, the overall
ecosystem, or the rights of future generations of humans. This definition
incorporates the idea that such resource usage is unsustainable with no
consideration for resource replenishment or for the integrity of the overall
ecosystem from which it is drawn.
A major problem in analyzing the norm of exploitation, then, is
that in contemporary times, given its commonly accepted pejorative mean-
ing, arguments for the unrestrained or minimally restrained utilization
of a resource are rarely couched in the language of exploitation by its pro-
ponents, who prefer to use the language of sustainable utilization or con-
servation. It is ultimately an empirical question whether the argument
proposed by a stakeholder is a conservationist one or whether it is exploi-
tationist under the "cover" of the language of conservation. For example,
we shall see that in the case of whaling, many whaling states such as
Japan and the former Soviet Union, despite a stated commitment to con-
servationist principles, continued to engage in exploitative whaling practices
' See Sompong Sucharitkul, State Responsibility and International Liability Under
International Law, 18 LoY. L.A. INTL & COMP. L.J. 821, 837 (1996).
5 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment Twenty-first Plenary Meeting,
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leading to the near extinction of certain whale types.59 However, the choice
not to use the explicit language of exploitation also provides a revealing
indication that support for the norm has waned.
In contrast to the norm of exploitation, the norms of conservation
and preservation have enjoyed prominence and influence within global
environmental regimes.60 The debate at the domestic level between those
advocating conservationism and those promoting preservationism served
to create the first wave of domestic ENGOs "in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries."6' The role played by the transnational successors of
these domestic ENGOs will form a key part of this article. That domestic
debate is now being played out on a global scale.62
Human understanding of the need to conserve resources is an
ancient one. The ancient idea of conservation can be found in such early
texts as the Bible, and the writings of Plato and Cicero. 3 Conservationism
as a concept "concedes that nature is not inexhaustible: accordingly, that
there are limits to material growth, and that husbandry must therefore
be practised because it becomes necessary to consider the interests of
human generations as yet unborn when determining courses of action."'
The conservationist approach is bound up with the production process and
regards the nonhuman world merely in terms of its use-value terms, as a
resource to be utilized.6" Therefore a conservationist perspective treats the
biosphere as a reservoir of matter-energy to be altered by technology for
human consumption.66 Such conservation can be of renewable or non-
renewable resources providing there is a husbanding of the resource for
the future where it is acknowledged that "it will be needed as much as
at present."6
7
59See infra Part IV.
o See Aynsley Kellow, Norms, Interests and Environment NGOs: The Limits of Cosmo-
politanism, ENVTL. POL., Autumn 2000, at 1, 17.61 NEIL CARTER, THE POLITICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT: IDEAS, ACTIVISM, POLICY 27 (2001).
62 See MARK J. SMITH, ECOLOGISM: TOwARDS ECOLOGICAL CITIZENSHIP 12-13 (1998).
6 ROBYN ECKERSLEY, ENViRONMENTALISM AND POLITICAL THEORY: TOWARD AN EcOCENTRIC
APPROACH 35 (1992).
6 PETER HAY, MAIN CURRENTS IN WESTERN ENvIRONMENTAL THOUGHT 33 (2002).
65 ECKERSLEY, supra note 63, at 36.
' This approach "mirrors Judeo-Christian traditions, especially in its anthropocentric
outlook. Nature and natural entities are not sacred, have no end or justification in and
of themselves, and exist solely as means in terms of which human ends might be
fulfilled." MAX OELSCHLAEGER, IDEA OF WILDERNESS: FROM PREHISTORY To THE AGE OF
ECOLOGY 287 (1993).67TAYLOR, supra note 47, at 298.
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This norm can be seen as a breaking away from the exploitative
practices of the past and accepting a more rational, cautious approach
to the husbanding of potentially scarce resources. Mark Smith argues that
the idea of conservationism has tended to act as a brake "to moderate the
pressures for an exploitative 'free for all' inherent in the drives which pro-
pel actions in economic markets" thus ameliorating damaging practices
of the past.68 Robyn Eckersley supports this position and argues further
that resource conservation can be seen as the first step away from un-
restrained development.69
Conservation is in many ways the least controversial environmen-
tal norm since it has at its heart a utilitarian, human-centered perspective
that seeks the greatest good for the greatest number of humans. Using
this norm to underpin a global environmental regime tends to invite
greater consensus from stakeholders as its argument that the environ-
ment is a resource that wisely must be utilized resonates deeply with
many cultures.7 0 It embodies a rhetoric of restraint which also suits the
interests of states seeking better economic returns from their resources.
Scientists have often been the transmitters for conservationist norms
within environmental regimes since the approach that resources should
be wisely used and husbanded for future generations has been central
to agriculture and forestry.7'
If the saving of a resource is from utilization rather than for
utilization, however, we are generally speaking of "preservation."72 John
Passmore defines preservation as "the attempt to maintain in their pres-
ent condition such areas of the earth's surface as do not yet bear the ob-
vious marks of man's handiwork and to protect from the risk of extinction
those species of living beings which man has not yet destroyed."73 Max
Oelschlaeger expands on this by arguing that preservationists reject the
notion that nature is merely a resource and instead prize wilderness
values, species rarity, and diversity.74 Anne and Paul Erlich are typical
6 SMITH, supra note 62, at 11 (emphasis added).
69 ECKERSLEY, supra note 63, at 37.
70 See, e.g., infra Part XIII.
71 TAYLOR, supra note 47, at 300-01.
72 See JOHN PASSMORE, MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATURE: ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS AND
WESTERN TRADITIONS 101 (1974).73 Id.
7 4 R.C. Paehlke, Environmental Values and Public Policy, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN
THE 1990S: REFORM OR REACTION 75, 78 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 3d ed.
1997).
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of those who espouse a preservationist viewpoint in that they argue that
the biosphere has a right to exist.75 Thus, at its heart, preservationism
accords an intrinsic or non-instrumental value to the world even if it
conflicts with human interests.76
Passmore, however, takes it as axiomatic that "true" preservation-
ist arguments must rely on the concept of intrinsic value." This position
is at odds with many preservationist theorists who also include instru-
mental arguments to support the preservation of nature.7 However, while
it is possible to argue preservationist positions from an instrumental per-
spective, doing so does a disservice to the intentions of many global actors
advocating preservation who argue that whales or other creatures deserve
not to be culled because they intrinsically have a right to exist. 79 At the
global level, ENGOs have been the prime norm entrepreneurs advocating,
with some success, that the intrinsic strand of preservationism should
underpin global environmental regimes concerned with the management
of species and wilderness areas. 0
Bryan Norton argues, at least in the short term, there is little dif-
ference between advocating conservationism and preservationism since
both views are dedicated to saving ecosystems and species."l However, the
two views often diverge at critical moments and may be traced to differing
philosophical belief systems. A conservationist may only save a resource
for use at a future time, while a preservationist desires to keep the re-
sources forever untrammeled and protected-thus sooner or later they
will find themselves at loggerheads.8 2 The case studies that are examined
in this article bear this out since the norm advocates of conservation and
7' George Sessions, Ecocentrism, Wilderness, and Global Ecosystem Protection, in THE
WILDERNESS CONDITION: ESSAYS ON ENVIRONMENT AND CIVILIZATION 90, 102 (Max
Oelschlaeger ed., 1992).
76 William Godfrey-Smith, The Rights of Non-Humans and Intrinsic Values, in ENVIRON-
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY 30, 31 (D.S. Mannison, M.A. McRobbie & R. Routley eds., 1980).
77 PASSMORE, supra note 72, at 124-26.
78 William Godfrey-Smith, The Value of Wilderness, 1 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 309, 310
(1979); Bryan G. Norton, Conservation and Preservation: A Conceptual Rehabilitation,
8 ENVTL. ETHICS 195, 196 (1986).
79 Anthony D'Amato & Sudhir K Chopra, Whales: Their Emerging Right to Life, 85 AM.
J. INTL L. 21, 45-46 (1991).
o Bryan G. Norton, The Cultural Approach to Conservation Biology, in ENvIRONMENTAL
ETHIcs: AN INTRODUCTION WITH READINGS 143, 149-50 (John Benson ed., 2000).
81 Id. at 146.
82 Id. at 146-47.
[Vol. 33:375388
20091 THE INT'L WHALING COMMISSION & PRESERVATIONISM
preservation want different outcomes and work to achieve new practices
and goals which are, at times, totally disparate.
III. GLOBAL INDusTRiAL EXPLOITATION OF WHALES
Whaling as an activity has been carried out from the dawn of
human history in many parts of the globe. 3 For centuries humans
treated whales as a "free resource," in the sense that they were consid-
ered a gift from nature to be exploited by anyone who could catch them.'
Until the development of more efficient harvesting technologies, how-
ever, humans lacked the ability to catch pelagic or large whales in large
numbers, so overexploitation of whales was not a problem.85
All that changed with the advent of industrial whaling, however,
which is thought to have originated with the Basques in the eleventh cen-
tury in the Bay of Biscay. 6 Such whaling was initially limited to coastal
shores and done from small boats.8" By the middle of the fifteenth cen-
tury, however, Basque whalers were venturing further afield, in ever-
larger boats, as far as the eastern coasts of Canada.88 Other nations soon
joined the hunt for what was then a huge population of different species
of whales. 9 By the seventeenth century whaling countries ventured as far
as the Arctic in pursuit of whales.9" In this period English and Dutch ves-
sels in the hundreds hunted primarily right whales-greenland whales
and nordcapers-in the Arctic, bringing untold wealth to their national
treasuries." From 1750 to 1870 whales were considered an economically
valuable source of oil, bone, and other products, such as perfume and
' Sebastian Oberthur, The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling: From
Over-Exploitation to Total Preservation, in YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION ON
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 1998/99 29, 29 (Helge Ole Bergesen, Georg Parmann,
and Oystein B. Thomnessen eds., 1998).
D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 79, at 28.
Oberthiir, supra note 83.
6 D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 79, at 28-29. Industrial whaling refers to the commercial
hunting of the larger, migratory seventy-nine whale species, for example, the blue whale.
Oberthir, supra note 83.87 ELIZABETH DESOMERE, THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT AND WORLD POLITICS 150 (2d ed.
2007).88Id.
89 See FARLEY MOWAT, SEA OF SLAUGHTER 210 (1989).
90 DESOMBRE, supra note 87.
91 COMM. FOR WHALING STATISTICS, INTERNATIONAL WHALING STATISTICS 114 (1931).
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clothing.92 From the mid to late 19th century, a whale carcass sold for
over U.S. $2000 making whaling a highly profitable enterprise.93
Modern whaling is considered to have commenced in 1864 when
Svend Foyn of Norway first used explosive grenade harpoons fired by can-
non to hunt whales from the northeast coast of Norway.94 This enabled
whalers to hunt larger, faster-swimming, rorqual whales such as blue, fin,
sei, and minke whales.95 Instead of rowboats, Foyn introduced small, fast
steamers, which came to be called catchers.96 These hunted whales for
permanent whale oil factories set up close to the whaling grounds.9" The
advent of these new technologies enabled whalers for the first time to begin
harvesting whales in large numbers, to the point that they threatened the
viability of several species of pelagic whales.9" These new whaling technolo-
gies enshrined exploitationist practices as the global standard.99
Both Elizabeth DeSombre and F. D. Ommanney maintain that it
was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that it became readily
apparent that human hunting of whales was having a negative impact on
whale stocks, but whaling continued at ever increasing rates, threatening
the species as a whole.' ° Robert Ellickson points out that prior to this point,
there might well have been a short-term economic incentive for states to
continue excessive hunting to prevent other whaling nations from exploiting
this resource.'' This type of state interest prevented a conservationist
regime from being put in place, as states jostled to secure relative gains over
92 See ALEXANDER STARBUCK, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WHALE FISHERY FROM ITS
EARLIEST INCEPTION TO THE YEAR 1876 (Argosy-Antiquarian 1964) (1878).
9 Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the
Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 84 (1989).
94See F. D. OMMANNEY, LOST LEVIATHAN 95 (1971). Svend Foyn's first use of the harpoon
gun was not auspicious. He managed to become entangled in the line and was hurled into
the water, but was rescued. Id.95 COMM. FOR WHALING STATISTICS, supra note 91, at 5; Ray Gambell, The International
Whaling Commission and the Contemporary Whaling Debate, in CONSERVATION AND
MANAGEMENT OF MARINE MAMMALS 179,180 (John R. Twiss Jr. & Randall R. Reeves eds.,
1999); PETER J. BRYANT, BIODIVERSITY AND CONSERVATION: A HYPERTEXT ARTICLE,
http://darwin.bio.uci.edu/-sustain/bio65/ lecO7/b651ec07.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2008).
" OMMANNEY, supra note 94, at 95-96.
97 COMM. FOR WHALING STATISTICS, supra note 91, at 5.
' See OMMANNEY, supra note 94, at 95-96.
99See DESOMBRE, supra note 87, at 151.
10" See id.; OMMANNEY, supra note 94, at 92. European whalers, such as the British,
French, and the Germans, continued large-scale hunting of Greenland bowhead whales
and Biscayan right whales throughout the 19th Century leading to the decimation of these
whale populations. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 79, at 28-29.
101 Ellickson, supra note 93, at 96.
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other states, leading to what we would now consider to be a classic instance
of the "tragedy of the commons." °2
At this point in time the idea of "frontier economics," with no
oversight of whaling practices, defined the whaling industry."3 Whalers
assumed that the marine environment consisted of virtually limitless re-
sources and that economic growth could be decoupled from nature.'" The
industry operated on a "boom to bust financial cycle,"'0 5 driven by the need
to maximize financial returns; short-term exploitation was enhanced by
the biological nature of whales, which are slow to mature compared to fish
stocks.' 6 By the nineteenth century whalers exploited whales so severely
that whaling vessels were compelled to go further out to hunt every year.' 7
Individually, whalers maximized their returns by taking all the whales
they could, using the newly developed technologies, without considering
managing the resource for the long term. This led to the inevitable ex-
tinction of coastal whale stocks.'0°
By the twentieth century whaling had developed into a global in-
dustry, supplying the world economies with whale oil and other byproducts
in vast quantities."° By the season of 1904-05 the newly developed factory
whaling ships had reached the hitherto pristine Antarctic waters at South
Georgia and there was no longer any place where whalers had not ven-
tured."l0 The use of steam was followed by diesel-powered floating factories,
which enabled the whalers to catch the faster-moving large fin-whales
(blue, fin, humpback and sei) and not to waste time towing carcasses to
land-based factories and risking loss of the corpse."'
The increased scale of exploitation caused concern in the tradi-
tional whaling states of Scandinavia, which attempted to regulate domes-
'02 PETER J. STOETT, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF WHALING 48 (1997).
103 Id. at 48-49.
'04 Id. at 48.
105 JOHN VOGLER, THE GLOBAL COMMONS: ENVrRONMENTAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL
GOVERNANCE 49 (2d ed. 2000).
" STOETr, supra note 102, at 52.
107 Ellickson, supra note 93, at 96.
"o Gambell, supra note 95; David G. Victor, Whale Sausage: Why the Whaling Regime
Does Not Need to Be Fixed, in TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE WHALING REGIME 292,295 (Robert
L. Friedheim ed., 2000).
'09 COMM. FOR WHALING STATISTICS, supra note 91.1 1 Id. at 14.
'
111 d. at 5. See id. at 14. In 1923 factory ships were made even more efficient when they
were built with a ramp at the stern to enable an entire whale to be brought aboard in a
matter of minutes. Id. at 15.
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tic whalers." 2 In 1902 Norway passed a law strictly limiting its whaling
companies' activities with the aim of conserving whale stocks as a valu-
able state asset."3 The new law stipulated that each whaling station was
to have only one catcher and the stations must be fifty miles apart."'
Iceland was the first state to put in place a domestic whaling moratorium
on whaling-for twenty years, starting from 1915.115
The taking of so many whales in the early part of the twentieth
century led to proposals for limited international regulation of the harvest-
ing of whales by the whaling industry, starting in 1918.116 Some elements
were cognizant that the industry relied on viable numbers of whales to be
profitable, but the effort came to naught and regulation was not agreed
to." 7 The imminent collapse of the whaling industry became an issue of
global concern with even the League of Nations becoming involved."'
At approximately the same time, the issue of managing global
marine resources as a whole began to emerge as a state issue." 9 Many
leaders and diplomats while acknowledging the need to protect these
resources from exploitation, felt that they lacked the technical knowl-
edge to guide their actions. 2 ° As a result, they tended to leave the
regulation of different marine species to those states with the greatest
interest in harvesting them.'2'
Organizations such as the Whaling Committee, established under
the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, comprised those
states that regularly whaled.'22 This started a long trend of whalers being
allowed to govern themselves, with disastrous results for whale stocks. 23
The Whaling Committee did attempt to regulate the industry at the 1927
meeting where the Norwegian delegate recommended curbing an open
slaughter approach to whaling. 124 He argued that a system of licences
112 See id. at 6-7.
113 COMM. FOR WHALING STATISTICS, supra note 91, at 7.
114 Id. at 10.
115 Chris Stroud, The Ethics and Politics of Whaling, in THE CONSERVATION OF WHALES




120 See Stroud, supra note 115, at 59-63.
121 See id.
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should be implemented.'25 This plea was unsuccessful, however, and
exploitation continued unabated.'26
IV. BUILDING A GLOBAL WHALING REGIME
Prior to the establishment of the IWC in the post-World War II
period, there were earlier attempts to create a global whaling regime.'27
The effort, however, was hampered by a lack of commitment from the rele-
vant parties, despite ample long-term economic imperatives to do so.
12
In the early 1930s, the killing of blue whales hit such heights that it de-
pressed whale oil prices. 2 s D'Amato and Chopra argue that at this point
whaling nations began to recognize the need to regulate the taking of
whales to prevent the extinction of the major whale species, acting out
of their own self-interest to maintain profits. 13 The whalers themselves
also had realized that the national controls proposed by states such as
Norway and Iceland were not sufficient and that a global regulatory
system aimed at stabilizing prices was needed.
131
After four years of negotiation between the states attached to the
League of Nations, the first Convention for the Regulation of Whaling
was created in 1931 in Geneva, Switzerland-the Geneva Convention.1
32
The Convention covered all waters-Article 9, including states' terri-
torial waters-Article 1, and it enforced the licensing of whaling
vessels-Article 8.133 It also exempted coastal aboriginal peoples provid-
ing they utilized "canoes, pirogues or other exclusively native craft
propelled by oars or sails" and did not use firearms or employ non-
aboriginals in their whaling activities.3
For the first time, conservation as a concept was applied globally
to whaling, though D'Amato and Chopra persuasively argue that the norm
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 STOET, supra note 102, at 57.
128 Id.
12 See THE COMM. FOR WHALING STATISTICS, INTERNATIONAL WHALING STATISTICS VI 4-5
(1935). In 1930-31, 42,874 whales were taken. Id.
130 D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 79, at 29.
131 See STOETT, supra note 102, at 57.
132 D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 79, at 30; STOETT, supra note 102, at 57.
13 Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, arts. 1, 8,9, Sept. 24, 1931, 155 L.N.T.S. 349.
13 Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, art. 3, Sept. 24, 1931, 155 L.N.T.S. 349,
quoted in Randall R. Reeves, The Origins and Character of 'Aboriginal Subsistence'
Whaling: A Global Review, 32 MAMMAL REv. 71, 72 (2002).
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was limited to merely protecting the long term viability of the whaling
industry rather than the welfare of whales.13' The Convention, while out-
lawing the "killing of calves, immature whales and female whales accom-
panied by calves" still allowed the hunting of adult whales virtually
unhindered. 136 Furthermore, Japan, Germany, and the U.S.S.R., all of
which were prolific whaling states, did not sign onto the Convention since
the economic incentives, in their eyes, were not sufficient enough to do
so.13 Without several of these key players, who accounted for approxi-
mately thirty percent of whale harvesting, the Convention was a collec-
tive failure and ineffective in its aims. 38
The failure of the Geneva Convention opened the door for whaling
companies to attempt to stabilize the situation. They created "a regime
of mutual production restraint,"' 9 known as the International Association
of Whaling Companies, to stabilize world oil prices by limiting production
of whale oil. 4 ° For the 1933-34 whaling season, the major Antarctic
whaling companies agreed to restrict their actions via this production
agreement.' 4 ' However, two British companies and one Norwegian
company refused to join the cartel and harvested 344,521 barrels of
whale oil. 142 Due to the defections of the British and Norwegian compa-
nies and to the collapse of the accord, in the 1934-35 period whaling in
Antarctica increased to 26,087 takings from 24,327 takings in the previ-
ous year.143 The global total was reported to the Committee for Whaling
Statistics as being 32,167 takings.14
John Vogler argues that the behavior of the whaling companies
was motivated more "by the need to maintain and support oil prices in
a depressed market rather than any concern with long-term sustainable
management."145 The refusal of some companies to amend their behavior
led to the Association collapsing, like many voluntary arrangements. This
manifests the predictable problem of collective action, as it gets ignored
... See D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 79, at 31.136 Id.
137 DESOMBRE, supra note 87, at 151. Germany was using whale oil to lessen their need
for importing edible oil and Japan was using the sale of whale oil to pay for its imperial
ambitions in China and Manchuria. Id.
138Id.
139 VOGLER, supra note 105, at 49.
1 DESOMBRE, supra note 87, at 151-52.




" VOGLER, supra note 105, at 49.
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when it goes against a particular agent's interests, it is subject to free
riding, and it is not recognized by more aggressive members, like whaling
nations such as Japan. 6'
In 1937 another global agreement was attempted between the
whaling nations of Argentina, Australia, Germany, the Irish Free State,
New Zealand, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States
of America. 4 7 All agreed to implement the 1937 International Agreement
for the Regulation ofWhaling.'" This is noteworthy because the Convention
covered for the first time shore-based operations and was the first compre-
hensive global whaling agreement. 49 The Convention outlawed the taking
of both gray whales and right whales, limited hunting areas by time and
geographic area, and regulated the length of the whaling season in order
to protect young and immature whales.' The problem was, again, the way
the main whaling states of this period-Japan, Germany, Chile, Argen-
tina, and the U.S.S.R.-refused to be bound by its provisions.' 5' In 1938,
a Protocol to the Convention "banned the taking of humpback whales for
two years except in the area south of forty degrees south latitude, where
a one-year ban was imposed."'52 In 1939, the Protocol was amended to
slightly increase protection for the humpback whale. 5 ' The problem re-
mained that, despite these added paper protections, the exploitation of
whales in the 1930s continued virtually unchecked.'
146 SeeDESOMBRE, supra note 87, at 152. With the failure of international accords, some
whaling states attempted to put in place domestic controls again. Norway, at this point
in time a leading proponent of a conservationist ethos to be applied to global whaling,
enacted a law on June 26, 1934, which limited the hunting season in Antarctic waters
from December 1st until March 31st from the 1934-35 season. Foreign whaling com-
panies agreed to adhere to the time limit affixed by the Norwegian Act of 1934, except
the Southern Whaling and Sealing Co. Ltd. and the Kerguelen Sealing and Whaling Co.
Ltd. THE COMM. FOR WHALING STATISTICS, INTERNATIONAL WHALING STATISTICS VII 1-2
(1936). The number of defectors from the production agreements soon doomed the agree-
ment to collapse, as those adhering to the accord were unwilling to allow the free-rider
companies to derive economic advantage from it.
147 INT'L COMMN ON WHALING, EIGHTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 3 (1957).
148 Id.
1 4 9 Id.
" D'Amato and Chopra, supra note 79, at 31.
151 STOETT, supra note 102, at 57.
152 D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 79, at 32.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 31-32.
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By the 1937-38 season the number of whales killed internation-
ally by whalers had risen to 54,664.15 Patricia Birnie argues that many
reasons caused this increase, including the "inadequacy of the scope of
the regulations themselves;" "lack of an adequate scientific base;" "non-
cooperation of some whaling states;" "poor enforcement [of agreements]
without international supervision;" and "lack of international community
participation or interest."156 To this impressive list of regulatory failures
can be added that it was in the economic interest of whalers to continue
harvesting what was perceived by many to be a "free" resource, to be
taken as quickly as technology allowed.
5 7
The only thing that prevented complete extinction of major whale
species at this time was the advent of World War II. Naval interdictions
confined most floating factories to port, while others were destroyed or
utilized in the war effort. 1 8 For example, only 6197 whales were caught
in the 1943-44 season, amounting to only about ten percent of pre-war
figures and allowing whale stocks to recover slightly.159 However, there
were still attempts by whaling states to better regulate the industry. 6 °
At the height of World War II in 1944, whaling states agreed that they
would attempt to regulate the whaling industry on the basis of how much
oil particular whales contained, and to restrict the size of a catch to a stan-
dard measure, known as the Blue Whale Unit ("BWU"), regardless of the
whale species being hunted.'6 '
15 PATRICIA BIRNIE, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF WHALING: FROM CONSERVATION OF
WHALING TO CONSERVATION OF WHALES AND REGULATION OF WHALE-WATCHING 129 (1985).
156 Id. at 129-30.
157 Id.
158 See INT'L COMM'N ON WHALING, supra note 147.
159 THE COMM. FOR WHALING STATISTICS, INTERNATIONAL WHALING STATISTICS XXXI 8
(1954).
160 THE COMM. FOR WHALING STATISTICS, INTERNATIONAL WHALING STATISTICS XXX 13
(1953).
161 DESOMBRE, supra note 87, at 152. The BWU, however, was a scientifically dubious
measurement devised in the 1930s as a way to quantify the oil produced from various
species of whale. Gregory Rose & George Paleokrassis, Compliance with International
Environmental Obligations: A Casestudy of the International Whaling Commission, in
IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 161 (James Cameron,
Jacob Werksman & Peter Roderick eds., 1996). One BWU was considered equal to one blue
whale, which was equal to two fin whales, which equaled two and a half humpback whales,
and six sei whales. INTL COMM'N ON WHALING, supra note 147, at 3. The imprecision of such
calculations only exacerbated the situation, since the methodology employed treated
whales merely as an exploitable resource, taking the focus away from the number of whales
killed and putting it on what each species economically provided.
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In the post-World War II period, edible fat was in short supply,
causing an upsurge in interest for this resource by even traditionally
non-whaling states. 6 2 At the close of World War II, the victorious Allies
resumed negotiations, under the auspices of the 1937 Agreement, to facil-
itate the orderly exploitation of whales.'63 A new set of regulations was
quickly drafted to apply for the 1945-46 season, which incorporated the
new BWU measure."6 It was agreed that the Antarctic season should be
ended when whalers had taken the equivalent of 16,000 BWUs.165 In the
1946-47 season the number of whales taken jumped to 34,720, and by the
following season it had increased to 43,378 BWUs. 66
The concomitant decrease in whale stocks alarmed environmen-
talists and those who saw this example of over-fishing as leading to not
only the extinction of whales, but also to the extinction of the whaling in-
dustry.167 This formed a powerful convergence of interests. 18 Combined
with this was a burgeoning understanding that whales should no longer
be seen as the property of individual states, but as a global resource.'69 In
1946, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson encapsulated the new mood
when he declared, "The world's whale stocks are a truly international
resource in that they belong to no one single nation, nor to a group of
nations, but rather they are wards of the entire world."1
71
V. THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE REGULATION OF
WHALING-1946
In this atmosphere of a reinvigorated whaling industry and a
greater appreciation of the nature of whales as a global resource, it is clear
that most whaling nations recognized that there was a need for a new and
more effective convention to prevent over-exploitation. 171 Heeding this call,
the United States, architect of much of the post-World War II political
landscape, spearheaded a call for an international conference to re-exam-
162 Oberthur, supra note 83, at 31.
'6 INT'L COMM'N ON WHALING, supra note 147.
164 Id.
165 id.
166 COMM. FOR WHALING STATISTICS, supra note 160, at 13.
167 See GRAEME J. APLIN, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CRISES: AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE
239-41 (1995).
" See id.; VOGLER, supra note 105, at 49.
169 See STOETT, supra note 102, at 30.
1 7
0 Id.
171 See D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 79, at 33.
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ine the issues. 172 Out of this conference came a new International Con-
vention for the Regulation of Whaling ("ICRW").11 3 This superseded all
previous agreements, coming into effect on November 10, 1948."7 It es-
tablished the IWC as the preeminent body regulating the global whaling
industry.'75 It introduced maximum catch quotas-16,000 BWUs-for
the total season for Antarctic pelagic whaling and initially encompassed
only the great whales. 176 The Preamble to the Convention highlighted that
whales needed to be protected against overfishing and that the delegates'
aim was to manage exploitation of the great whales.'77 The Preamble's
language, however, incorporated the more conservationist goals of inter-
generational equity and the safeguarding of endangered species. 78
The Preamble outlined the Convention as being about the orderly
development of a commercial whaling industry and the conservation of
existing whale stocks.'79 The inherent tension between these dichotomous
aims would lead to much acrimony between member-states, as they could
not be easily reconciled.' 0 Vogler argues that whilst the Preamble paid
lip service to the norm of conservation, it was essentially an arrangement
between states with an interest in commercially exploiting whales.
181
Certainly conservation was understood to be merely the facilitation of an
orderly resource allocation regime, rather than the maintenance of suffi-
cient stock for future generations.8 2 The ICRW did enable the opening up
of a discourse between whaling states, however, whereby it was permis-
sible to consider protecting whales as an objective.8 3




75 INT'L COMM'N ON WHALING, FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 3 (1950); Reeves, supra
note 134. The Convention was signed by the delegates of Argentina, Australia, Brazil,
Canada, Chile, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, the
United Kingdom including Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and the
U.S.S.R. on December 2, 1946. INTL COMM'N ON WHALING, supra.
176 D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 79, at 32; VOGLER, supra note 105, at 53.
177 VOGLER, supra note 105, at 49.
178 See INT'L COMM'N ON WHALING, supra note 175, at 9.
179 VOGLER, supra note 105, at 49.
180 Rose & Paleokrassis, supra note 161, at 29.
181 VOGLER, supra note 105, at 50. The United Kingdom delegation to the 1945 meeting
argued that it would be, in his view, a "tragedy if any international machinery were to
get in the way of increased production," and this was indicative of the position of all the
whaling nations. Id.
'
82 Id. at 49.
183 See D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 79, at 32-34; Tora Skodvin & Steinar Andresen,
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The Convention created the IWC as a supra-authority with the
power to issue binding regulations to protect whales.'8S Its establishment
as the global regulatory body for whaling meant that the norms underpin-
ning the organization would reflect those operating in the broader world.
The IWC was initially composed of delegates of the signatory whaling
nations, but was open to all states and was to meet annually to review the
schedule on impermissible whaling activities.'85 Allowing other states to
join the IWC, whether whaling nations or not, was to prove a critical
factor in norm transformation. This step would not have occurred in the
absence of this new view that whales should be considered a global re-
source and not just the property of whaling states. The provision allowed
states to circumvent potential veto coalitions by recruiting like-minded
allies, a tactic used by both pro- and anti-whaling forces.' The powers of
the ICW to protect whales from exploitation are enumerated in a Schedule
which allowed the body to:
fix protected and unprotected species; open and closed sea-
sons; open and closed areas, including sanctuaries; limita-
tions on the size of species taken; methods and intensity
of whaling, including maximum catch; types of gear and
equipment used; methods of measuring whales taken; the
requirement that returns be made of catch; and statistical
and other biological information.8 7
The IWC operates under a majority-voting rule that requires a
three-quarter majority of present members to vote to approve changes
to the Schedule, which contains the operative rules governing the global
whaling regime.' The ICRW also allows dissenting states to opt out of
any decision arrived at within the IWC by filing an objection within ninety
days and applying for an exemption under Article V(3), a loophole that
would allow rogue whaling states significant wiggle room in evading IWC
Nonstate Influence in the International Whaling Commission, 1970-1990, GLOBAL ENVTL.
POL., Nov. 2003, at 61, 71.
18 Rose & Paleokrassis, supra note 161, at 29.
18 Skodvin & Andresen, supra note 183, at 70-71. Initially only fifteen nations participated
in meetings, and they were overwhelmingly whaling nations. Id. at 71.
116 GARETH PORTER, JANET WELSH BROWN & PAMELA S. CHASEK, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLrrcs 95 (3d ed. 2000).17 D'Amato and Chopra, supra note 79, at 34.
'
8 VOGLER, supra note 105, at 51.
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directives." 9 Objections were so common in the first few decades of the
IWC that it was rendered virtually impotent. 9 °
Enforcement of IWC regulations was left to individual member-
states, and because their interests lay in the unhindered continuation
of whaling, they were unlikely to police themselves rigorously. 9 ' Further
the Commission was powerless to regulate the activities of non-member
countries since the Convention was not applicable to non-members. 92
The ICRW allowed under its "primary rules"-the regulations at-
tached to the Schedule to the ICRW-for the creation of conservationist
programs to enhance the protection of existing and future whale stocks.'93
It also allowed for potential preservationist outcomes in that the IWC
had the power to create whaling sanctuaries and ban the taking of par-
ticular whale species.'9 4 At this point in time, however, IWC members
could not even frame the question as to what whale preservation meant,
let alone answer it, since no member-states thought of whales as intrinsi-
cally worth saving.' 95 The ICRW Schedule also banned the taking of grey,
humpback, and right whales in certain areas.19 However, this restriction,
combined with seasonal time limits and quotas, was unsuccessful in stop-
ping the ongoing exploitation of whales, despite the emphasis on limited
conservationist aims in the ICRW. 9 v
189 See Oberthiir, supra note 83, at 30.
190 See, e.g., infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
See Adrienne M. Ruffle, Resurrecting the International Whaling Commission: Suggestions
to Strengthen the Conservation Effort, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 639, 642 (2002).
192Id.
'93 Rose & Paleokrassis, supra note 161, at 154. To amend the constitution requires the
agreement of all IWC member-states, but amendments to the Schedule Regulations, under
Article III, can be passed with merely a three-quarters majority. These regulations are
also binding on all members whether they vote for them or not. Id. These two factors had
a profound effect on the normative direction of the organization since most normative
advocacy focused on changing the regulations due to the relative ease of doing so.
19 Id.; see also infra Part XIV.
... See Milton M.R. Freeman, Political Issues with Regard to Contemporary Whaling, in
WHO'S AFRAID OF COMPROMISE? 10, 12-13 (Simon Ward ed., 1990).1
'
9 INT'L COMM'N ON WHALING, supra note 175, at 5. Yet, the IWC, as one of its first acts,
passed Resolution 11 which permitted the hunting of 1250 humpback whales south of forty
degrees South Latitude in both the 1949-50 and 1950-51 seasons. Id.
"' The initial IWC Regulations were similar to those in force in the 1937-38 season. The
maximum pelagic catch ofbaleen whales was set at 16,000 blue whale units. The harvest
period was fixed from December 15, 1948 until April 1, 1949, and whaling from shore
stations was fixed at six months. THE COMM. FOR WHALING STATISTICS, INTERNATIONAL
WHALING STATISTICS XXIV 7 (1950). If the level of 16,000 BWUs was reached before the
end of the hunting season, the operations were to stop immediately. Id. at 8.
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In fact, the restrictions on taking certain whale species has had
an effect opposite to that intended. It set in train a technological race to
create better ships and more advanced killing technologies to achieve des-
ignated quotas as rapidly as possible, leading to whalers to refer to the
period as the "Whaling Olympic." 9 ' During this period in the late 1940s,
whalers raced the clock to catch whales before the season ended, in an
effort to beat the competition. 199 From 1946 to 1951 the whaling season
shrank from 112 days to only 64, but the catching technologies became
more efficient."' An unintended consequence of the new, deadlier ships,
however, was a significant increase in the cost of outfitting a whaling
fleet.2"' By 1960, some nations had ceased whaling on economic grounds,
due to the prohibitive capital costs against returns.2 2
Problematically, the IWC set initial whaling quotas too high to en-
sure whaling states would not pull out of the IWC, yet even so, they were
usually exceeded.203 By the 1948-49 season, whaling had rebounded from
the World War II interregnum, and 31,262 whales were taken.21 Through-
out the 1950s, the whale catch continued to increase despite the presence
of the IWC and its conservationist edicts.05 IWC prohibitions to ban the
198 Rose & Paleokrassis, supra note 161, at 161; DESOMBRE, supra note 87, at 154.
199 DESOMBRE, supra note 87, at 154.
200 Id.
201 Id.
2 o Id. While the number of floating factory ships and catchers were down from pre-World
War II numbers, the average size of the catchers ships had increased, as had their engine
power. The average horsepower of the catcher ships had increased from 1100 before the
war to 1562 in 1948-49, enabling a greater taking capacity. THE COMM. FOR WHALING
STATISTICS, supra note 197, at 11.203 DESOMBRE, supra note 87, at 147. See also INT'L COMM'N ON WHALING, THIRD REPORT
OF THE COMMISSION 15 (1952). The report stated that the 16,000 BWU limit had been
exceeded by 413 for that year.2 4 THE COMM. FOR WHALING STATISTICS, supra note 197, at 10.
15 The IWC responded to the ongoing situation by resolving at its fourth meeting to stop
taking blue whales smaller than seventy feet, sei whales smaller than forty feet, and hump-
back whales smaller than thirty-five feet. The same meeting banned factory ships and
catchers from catching baleen whales in certain areas. INTL COMMN ON WHALING, FOURTH
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 12-13 (1953). At the 1955 1WC meeting, members approved
conservationist measures with and placed prohibitions on the taking of any blue whales
in parts of the North Pacific Ocean and humpback whales in the North Atlantic Ocean
for five years. Similar prohibitions banned the taking of sperm whales or minke whales
except as permitted by contracting governments. INT'L COMM'N ON WHALING, SIXTH REPORT
OF THE COMMISSION 5 (1955). In 1955, the Scientific Sub-committee recommended that
the Pacific Sanctuary be re-opened; the recommendation was accepted, but the delegates
refused to reduce the BWTU limit by 500, negating the decision. Id. at 17, 19.
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taking of certain species for a limited time were met by numerous states
lodging objections, including Canada, Japan, the United States, and the
Soviet Union.2' This enabled these states to continue their ability to ex-
ploit whales unchecked. 20 7 In the 1950-51 whaling period, 55,795 whales
were taken globally, the largest number to recorded kills until then..20 By
the 1957-58 season, the number of floating factories operating in Antarctic
waters had increased to twenty with two shore stations and 257 catchers,
and by the following season whalers killed a new high of 64,586 whales.0 9
D'Amato and Chopra characterize the period from 1948 to 1960 as
"wasted years," in that states continued to argue mainly over quota allo-
cations, backed by grandstanding threats of withdrawal from the IWC.
210
Before 1960, the whaling industry dominated the IWC, mostly through
their national government delegates. The IWC was still "a whalers' club"
and the majority of members were themselves whaling nations whose
interests were synonymous with whaling industry interests.2 1'
Indeed, not only were many state delegations filled with mem-
bers with a pro-whaling bent, but from the second meeting onwards atten-
dance at the IWC included representatives of the Association of Whaling
Companies.212 The IWC in this period had little sense of urgency when it
came to protecting whales, perceiving them only as a resource to be uti-
lized. 21' For many states, the establishment of a regime was considered
to have "solved" the problem, despite the voluminous evidence that the
problem was worsening.214 Frustrated delegates to the ICW, who wanted
to promote a conservationist platform, could not alter the situation in a
context where there was little public knowledge of whaling issues and
practices.21 5
206 INT'L COMM'N ON WHALING, SEVENTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 6 (1956).
2 Id.; Peterson, supra note 4, at 157.
208 THE COMM. FOR WHALING STATISTICS, supra note 160, at 2.
209 COMM. FOR WHALING STATISTICS; INTERNATIONAL WHALING STATISTICS XLI 1 (1959);
COMM. FOR WHALING STATISTICS, INTERNATIONAL WHALING STATISTICS XLIII 8 (1960).
210 D'Amato and Chopra, supra note 79, at 34-35.
211 Skodvin & Andresen, supra note 183, at 63.
212 INT'L COMMN ON WHALING, SECOND REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 3 (1951).
213 Peterson, supra note 4, at 158.
214 Id.
2 15 Id. at 158-59.
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VI. SCIENTISTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION
By the 1960 IWC meeting in London, it was clear to most IWC
members, based on their own compiled figures, that stocks of blue whales,
fin whales, and humpback whales had declined to crisis levels.21 With the
situation at crisis point, the delegates turned to a hitherto ignored group,
cetologists, to provide a new conservationist policy direction.211 Up until
this point, scientists had been perceived, and had acted, as virtual mouth-
pieces for their states, with their policy prescriptions tending to reflect
nationalistic demands for whale products. 21 8 To ensure that scientific
advice given to the member-states was not tainted by states' interests, the
United Kingdom proposed that a Committee of three independent scien-
tists, and later four, be established and the motion was passed.219 The
Committee's role would be to quantify potential catch reductions to allow
policy to be determined on more objective grounds.220
Once freed of the constraints of serving as states' spokesmen, the
scientists quickly exhibited a high degree of independence in their scien-
tific advice.22' Given that most cetologists' backgrounds were in biology,
it was not surprising that their advice regarding whaling reflected that
background and focused on the conservation of whale stocks. 22 Acting as
normative entrepreneurs, they advocated quotas to protect scientifically
determined, fragile whale stocks, to impose temporary moratoriums, and
to reduce the overall catch.223
Despite their efforts, their efficacy as advocates was severely lim-
ited by a number of factors. They were small in number, thirty at most,
and their advice was merely advisory in nature, advice which member-
states were free to disregard or object to if it was not in accordance with
their interests.224 Problematically, cetologists also lacked the theoretical
216 INT'L COMM'N ON WHALING, TWELFTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 14-15 (1961).
21 See Skodvin & Andresen, supra note 183, at 71-72. During the first few years of the
IWC, the scientific representation to the Committee was sporadic, with few states sending
representatives and the state of knowledge of whale stocks minimal and disputed. When
scientific advice was considered, it was generally ignored by states. Id. at 71.
218 PORTER, BROWN & CHASEK, supra note 186, at 94; Skodvin & Andresen, supra note
183, at 75-76.
219 Peterson, supra note 4, at 162-63.
Skodvin & Andresen, supra note 183, at 75-76.
221 See Peterson, supra note 4, at 163.
Id.
See id. at 153; Rose & Paleokrassis, supra note 161, at 154.
22 Charlotte Epstein, Knowledge and Power in Global Environmental Activism, 10 INTL
J. PEACE STUD. 47, 53-54 (2005); Peterson, supra note 4, at 154.
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models and a consensus amongst themselves as to the correct policy
prescriptions, without which they could not plausibly convince whaling
states to abandon exploitationist practices.225 Further, they were unable
to link their arguments with higher values that would persuade whaling
states to adopt conservationist practices.226 Lastly, they were constrained
by the platform from which they had to communicate. Scientists were
forced to conform to the agenda and operating norms of the IWC. This
limited their effectiveness.22 v It limited their ability to communicate the
need for conservationist mores and despite their best efforts, the overall
harvest rate was not limited for a further eighteen years.228
By the 1967 IWC meeting in London, the Joint Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State for Scotland, Mr. Buchan, revealed in his open-
ing speech to the IWC some sobering statistics regarding the perilous
state of global whale stocks.229 In 1937 there were approximately 100,000
blue whales in the oceans.2"' By 1967, there were approximately 1000.231
The official BWU catch limit set at that meeting was only 3500,232 but
there were reports that whalers were going after younger whales.233 By the
1971 IWC meeting it was clear to many IWC members that whale stocks
were not recovering, but were going backwards.23 a In a breakthrough,
however, the United States due to domestic pressure decided to put eight
types of whales on the domestic Endangered Species List and that, as a
country, it would no longer issue licenses for its whalers to hunt.235 This
defection by the United States from the whalers' faction would prove a
critical factor in the normative battles ahead, since its relative economic
power in the global system ensured states were wary of crossing it, for
fear of sanctions or other retributive action.236
It was clear that the IWC as an entity was unable to change the ex-
ploitationist ways of its members, in view of the vested economic interests
at play, which were dedicated to preserving the status quo. However, the
sea change in the U.S. foreign policy on whaling led them to seek another
' See Oberthiir, supra note 83, at 31; Peterson, supra note 4, at 160.
26 Peterson, supra note 4, at 161.
227 Skodvin & Andresen, supra note 183, at 71.
22 Rose & Paleokrassis, supra note 161, at 154.




033 See PORTER, BROWN & CHASEK, supra note 186, at 94.
' See id.
235 Id.
236 See Oberthir, supra note 83, at 33-34.
[Vol. 33:375404
20091 THE INT'L WHALING COMMISSION & PRESERVATIONISM
forum to raise the matter, which they duly did, at the 1972 United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, Sweden.23 v At
Committee Two of the Conference, which examined questions of natural
resource management, the United States called for a ten-year morato-
rium -Resolution 33-on whaling to enable stocks to replenish.238
States at this point were still advocating the conservation of species for
future use.239 Predictably, whaling nations, like Japan, automatically
opposed such a measure since it was not in their interests.2 40 Over their
objections, the motion was passed 52-02" and was included in the confer-
ence recommendations, despite the IWC's Scientific Committee arguing
that any such action was not scientifically valid.242
The passing of the motion by such an overwhelming margin indi-
cates that saving the whales was now perceived by much of the world as
an issue of critical importance. Further, the IWC as an organization was
put on notice that other parties challenged the IWC's ineffective approach
to date. D'Amato and Chopra argue it is difficult to pinpoint when mea-
sures undertaken to protect the whaling industry started "to become
transformed into protective measures undertaken for the survival and
longevity of whales as a species" because it is difficult to measure when
global psychological change becomes reflected in legal texts.243
To focus on the economic or institutional arguments, however, is
to overlook the moral sea-change in general attitudes to the depletion of
whale stocks. Critically, the issue of overexploiting whales was becoming
one of global concern at a time when the global public was becoming
more worried and better educated on global environmental issues. This
global concern provided both a backdrop and a fillip to ENGO articula-
tions of a preservationist position and to the attempt to persuade IWC
members of the need to alter their behavior.244
" See David D. Caron, The International Whaling Commission and the North Atlantic
Marine Mammal Commission: The Institutional Risks of Coercion in Consensual Structures,
89 AM. J. INT'L L. 154, 156 (1995).
m STOErT, supra note 102, at 65; REx WEYLER, GREENPEACE: HOW A GROUP OF JOURNALT,
ECOLOGISTS AND VISIONARIES CHANGED THE WORLD 211 (2004).
239 See DESOMBRE, supra note 87, at 155.
24oD'Amato & Chopra, supra note 79, at 38. Japan's response to the UN Conference on the
Human Environment was to label the moratorium proposal as "dramatic and emotional."
Id.
241 PORTER, BROWN & CHASEK, supra note 186, at 94.
D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 79, at 39.243 Id. at 32-33.
244 Oberthur, supra note 83, at 31.
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VII. ENGOs AND THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION
Any understanding of the shift in the IWC's operating norm must
account for the role played by ENGOs, who in the 1970s pushed a pres-
ervationist agenda both within the IWC and to the global society in gen-
eral.245 Initially ENGOs had little interest in the IWC and they did not
even attend until the fifteenth meeting when Major K.R.C. Priestley
represented the International Society for the Protection of Animals.246 In
the 1960s, the environmental movement's arguments on whaling were in
accord with the position of scientists, namely that conservationist pro-
grams were needed.2 47 However, the decision by the IWC in 1970 to allow
ENGOs to make statements opened the door for the more forceful articu-
lation of environmental positions to the IWC members.2" Despite this
availability, it was not until Greenpeace, an organization founded on a
"biocentric philosophy that challenged the idea that humans were the
supreme beings on the face of the planet," became involved in the mid-
1970s that a preservationist normative position was put forth.249 For envi-
ronmentalists, whales became a potent symbol of the entire environmental
movement's commitment to save the planet and bring about a more eco-
logically aware society.25 °
ENGOs like Greenpeace, the World Wildlife Fund, the International
Fund for Animal Welfare, and the Environmental Investigation Agency
were able to tap into, articulate, and publicize the Western public's horrific
response to whaling.25' Their tactics were to use mostly peaceful protests
and public information campaigns to highlight the brutality of whaling
and its impact on whale species and persuade the global populace to end
whale hunting and reframe the debate from one of exploitation or conser-
vation to one of preserving all whales in perpetuity.252
Their aim was to put pressure on the regime states to change their
expectations, behaviors, and identities. DeSombre argues that rather than
245 See id.
246 See INT'L COMM'N ON WHALING, FIFTEENTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 11 (1965).
Skodvin & Andresen, supra note 183, at 73.
See INT'L COMM'N ON WHALING, TWENTY-SECOND REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 20
(1972). Representatives of the Fauna Preservation Society, the International Society for
the Protection of Animals, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and
Natural Resources, and the World Wildlife Fund all made statements. Id.
2
"
9 See Peterson, supra note 4, at 184.250 Id.
21 VOGLER, supra note 105, at 50.
252 STOETT, supra note 102, at 94-95.
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using science to advance their position, the ENGOs conducted a campaign
that focused on brutality, capturing images that promoted their view that
whaling was barbarous and should be ended.253 They linked their argu-
ments to higher values that highlighted the intelligence and uniqueness
of whales and argued that they therefore deserved to live unhindered.254
Framing their approach in this way helped their arguments resonate with
the global public in a way scientists, up until that point, had been unable
to do. This put increased pressure on states to alter their behavior.255 By
the early 1980s, over fifty ENGOs were represented at the IWC in an
effort to influence debates, either by persuasion, by direct action, or by
putting states on notice that the constituents they represented were
watching.256
The IWC's own downplayed, but still worrying figures backed up
the ENGO's case that the whale conservation methods that had been uti-
lized to date were not working. Initially, anti-whaling groups concentrated
on arguing their case in terms of extinction. However, when nations like
Japan were able to argue plausibly that there was no threat of extinction
of certain species (such as minke whales), anti-whaling states and ENGOs
shifted ground to argue that it was simply unethical to kill whales.257
Initially, the ENGOs made little headway despite the global para-
digm shift in thinking on the issue that had begun to manifest.25 How-
ever, there were signs that the member-states knew that their approach
to date had not been effective in promoting conservationist practices. For
example, upon the advice of the Scientific Committee, the IWC voted to
discard the BWU measurement in favor of fixing catch limits by species for
the future. The larger issues of catch size remained off-limits, though.
259
25 DESOMBRE, supra note 87, at 163.
254 Wapner, supra note 1, at 48. ENGOs mounted a campaign to educate the global public
about the anthropomorphic qualities of whales, using photographs, film, and audio record-
ings purported to show "evidence" of the intelligence and uniqueness of whales. Some
ENGOs pursued direct action methods against whalers and promoted these mini-dramas
to global media outlets to emphasize their points. Id.
255 See DESOMBRE, supra note 87, at 163-64.21 See Oberthir, supra note 83, at 31. These included such well-known ENGOs as Friends
of the Earth, Greenpeace International, the World Wildlife Fund, and the International
Society for the Protection of Animals. See STOETr, supra note 102, at 95.
257 IsAo MIYAOKA, LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY: JAPAN'S REACTION TO GLOBAL
WILDLIFE PRESERVATION 90-91 (2004).258 See infra Part VIII.
259 See IML COMMN ON WHALING, TWENTY-FOURTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 20 (1974).
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VIII. THE PUSH TO IMPOSE A MORATORIUM
At the 1972 IWC meeting in London, Maurice Strong, the U.N.
Secretary-General put to members the case that as the just-completed
U.N. Conference on Human Environment had resolved that there should
be a ten-year moratorium on all commercial whaling, the IWC should ad-
dress the issue.26" The United States and the United Kingdom delega-
tions moved a global moratorium motion, arguing that the current
assessment of whale stocks was so poor that it would be prudent to stop
whaling.261 Such a moratorium on whaling was initially perceived as a
conservationist measure that would allow stocks to recover over time.262
However, the Scientific Committee argued successfully that a blanket
ban should not be imposed since whaling was better regulated at the
individual species level, and a moratorium would lead to a reduced
research program on whales and possibly the unregulated taking of
whales. 263 The IWC voted the motion down with four countries voting for
the proposal and seven against, and three abstentions.264 To make
matters worse, the IWC yet again set quotas that were higher than the
previous year's catches.265
At both the 1973 and 1974 IWC meetings, the U.S. delegation,
backed by Argentina and France, again called for the moratorium to be
implemented, citing new research that whaling populations had been
reduced from four to five million down to a few hundred thousand.266 A
similar appeal for a ban, backed by Mexico, was also made to the IWC
in 1974.267 The petitions were unsuccessful in the face of opposition from
Japan and the U.S.S.R., who, acting in concert, argued that stocks of fin,
sei, and sperm whales were still plentiful enough to hunt.26" However,
it did open the door in 1974 for delegates from the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, the United Nations Environment
2 6 0 Id. at 23-24.
2 61 Id. at 24.
212 See D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 79, at 38.
263 INT'L COMM'N ON WHALING, supra note 258, at 24-25.
264 Id. at 25.
265 Compare INT'L COMM'N ON WHALING, TWENTY-FOURTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
(1974) with INTL COMM'N ON WHALING, TWENTY-THIRD REPORT OF THE COMMISSION (1973)
and INT'L COMM'N ON WHALING, TWENTY-SECOND REPORT OF THE COMMISSION (1972).
266 INT'L COMM'N ON WHALING, TWENTY-FIFTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 26 (1975);
WEYLER, supra note 237, at 215.
27 INT'L COMMWN ON WHALING, TWENTY-SIXTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 25 (1976).
' WEYLER, supra note 237, at 215.
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Programme, and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature
to formally play a part at IWC meetings as a compromise measure. 9
The participation of these international organizations proved to be
crucial, as it paved the way for alternative non-state arguments to be
presented."'
At this point in history, the IWC member-states were unclear in
their language as to what the normative position of the IWC should be.
At the 1974 meeting, an amending resolution to the global moratorium
on commercial whaling, proposed by Australia and Denmark, argued
there was a "need to preserve and enhance whale stocks as a resource for
future use and taking into consideration the interests of consumers of
whale products and the whaling industry as required by the Interna-
tional Convention on Whaling."271 The resolution was adopted by the
members with the amendment of "present" being added before the term
"future," demonstrating that the member-states were still primarily
focused on the short-term at the expense of future generations of whalers
and whales. 2
The same IWC meeting attempted to introduce a new conserva-
tionist measure to replace the BWU designation with new terminology. 3
The Australian delegate put forth a selective moratorium schema, which
came to be known as the New Management Procedure ("NMP). 2 74 The
NMP placed each whale species into three distinct groupings, as des-
ignated by the Scientific Committee. 5 It was intended to manage whale
stocks by utilizing the idea of "Maximum Sustainable Yield" ("MSY").
27 6
This program was implemented in 1975 and reduced quotas for whales.27
However, the program was ineffective in preventing the exploitation of
269 D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 79, at 39-40.
270 See id.
271 IN'L COMM'N ON WHALING, supra note 265 (emphasis added).
272 I d. at 26.
273 Id. at 25-26.
274 See D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 79, at 40.
275 INTL COMM'N ON WHALING, supra note 265, at 25-26.
276 See id.; Rose & Paleokrassis, supra note 161, at 161; Stroud, supra note 115, at 77.
The MSY was calculated by analyzing whale stocks according to three criteria. Level one
was "Protection Stocks," where hunting was banned until whale stocks had recovered to
acceptable levels. "Sustained Management Stock" were whale types designated "at or
near" MSY levels, and were meant to be maintained at those numbers. The third grouping,
"Initial Management Stocks," could be lowered, presumably by hunting, to the designated
MSY. INT'L COMM'N ON WHALING, supra note 265, at 26.
27 INTL COMM'N ON WHALING, supra note 265, at 26.
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whales due to poor biological data on whale species and their decline. 8
This was critical to determining the correct levels to be set.279
The creation of the NMP did not achieve its primary conservation-
ist goal.28° It did improve the tenor of scientific practices that influence
decision-making, however."' Before, scientific-members gave a unanimous
"best estimate" of whale stocks without any concomitant scientific basis. 2
Now, in response to outside pressure from both scientists and ENGOs, com-
mittee members created a more open model by which scientific papers
were published and criticism sought.2' This enhanced the credibility of
the cetologists as advocates.2"
Despite being allowed to attend as observers by the IWC in 1977,
cetologists were unable to speak with a unified voice, fracturing over
questions of "uncertainty" when applied to whale stocks. 2 5 By 1982, the
Scientific Committee was so at war internally between conservationists
and preservationists that it was unable to even discuss the content of any
paper submitted to it for approval.2 6 M. J. Peterson argues that the rift
was so wide that cetologists were unable to function as a coherent lobby
group between 1974 and 1982, opening the door for ENGOs to become the
primary normative advocates on whaling issues.287
The ENGOs, building on their successes in domestically altering
the whaling policies of states like Australia, Argentina, Uruguay and the
Netherlands, were determined to translate their policies into action in
the global sphere.28 By 1979, ENGOs were able to attend IWC meetings
officially in the dual roles as observers and in some cases as delegation
278 See Stroud, supra note 115, at 77.
279 See INT'L COMM'N ON WHALING, supra note 265, at 25-26; Rose & Paleokrassis, supra
note 161, at 161; Stroud, supra note 115, at 77.
2 See Stroud, supra note 115, at 77.
281 Skodvin & Andresen, supra note 183, at 72.
282 See id. at 76.
28 3 Id. at 72.
8 See id. at 72-73.
2 Peterson, supra note 4, at 169-70.
286 HIGH NORTH WEB, THE MORATORIUM, http://www.highnorth.no/iwc2000/briefings/
Moratorium.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2008).
2
"
7 See Peterson, supra note 4, at 169-70.
2m See DESOMBRE, supra note 87, at 137-38. For example, in Australia, this occurred be-
cause of domestic anti-whaling campaigns which won the support of the National Liberal
government after the 1977 election. In the case of the Netherlands, the country had stopped
whaling but remained in the IWC to prevent commercial whaling. See id. at 138; Peterson,
supra note 4, at 169-70.
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members.8 9 Vogler argues that their activities were particularly effective
in regards to nations that had stopped whaling (because it was no longer
a viable business) as well as on traditional non-whaling states.290
The 1977 meeting in Canberra set a new benchmark for ENGO pro-
tests and political actions. The ENGOs were determined to forcibly make
their point that whales were not to be hunted.2 91 ENGO tactics to pressure
the IWC included a coalition of ENGOs, with the Whale and Dolphin
Coalition and Project Jonah at the forefront. 292 They placed a twelve metre
inflatable white whale in the lake next to the meeting place.2 93 At the
same meeting, Jean-Paul Forton-Gouin, a wealthy Frenchman who sup-
ported the ENGO position, managed to gain entrance to the IWC by funding
a Panamanian delegation and having himself declared a Commissioner,
a tactic which the ENGOs would later use to great effect.294
That meeting also saw for the first time a ban on aboriginal whal-
ing of the Arctic bowhead whale, the most threatened whale species,
though the ban was subsequently lifted in 1978 at the request of the
United States, where domestically indigenous groups had brought legal
action arguing that the ban infringed their Constitutional rights. 295 The
United States had been at the vanguard of the moratorium approach, so
this perceived backdown weakened its moral legitimacy. 6 Peru advanced
two more moratorium proposals, but these were quickly taken offthe table
when it was obvious they would not be successful.297
Despite its lack of moral legitimacy, the United States was willing
to use its economic power to achieve its goal of imposing a global morato-
rium on whaling.298 Under the U.S. Pelly Act provisions, the United States
certified Chile, Peru, and South Korea in 1978 for continued whaling.
299
289 INT'L COMM'N ON WHALING, TWENTY-NINTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 31 (1979).
See VOGLER, supra note 105, at 51.
See Warwick Stanley, A Whale of a Time, THE SYDNEYMORNING HERALD, Nov. 7,2008
(reviewing CHRIS PASH, THE LAST WHALE (2008)).
292 Id.
291 Id.; see also Mark Whittaker, Whale Tales, THE AUSTRALIAN, Aug. 11, 2007. The whale
was eventually discovered "blown up inside a hotel where many of the delegates were
staying." This led to a situation where hotel staff and police destroyed the inflatable
whale with knifes in front of the media's television cameras in a wonderful publicity coup
for the ENGOs. Id.
See WEYLER, supra note 237, at 472.
See D'Amato and Chopra, supra note 79, at 41-42.
2 Id. at 42.
Id. at 42; see INT'L COMM'N ON WHALING, supra note 288, at 18.
See Skodvin & Andresen, supra note 183, at 74.
See DESOMBRE, supra note 87, at 134. In 1972 the U.S. Congress enacted the Marine
Mammal Protection Act ("MMPA") that put in place a moratorium on harvesting and
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Under this pressure from a significant trading partner all agreed to be
bound by IWC decisions in future. °0 The United States also certified
Taiwan, which was not a signatory to the ICRW, in 1980. Fearful of alien-
ating a powerful trading partner, Taiwan decided to ban all foreign whal-
ing from its waters and then imposed on itself a ban on whaling in 1981.301
Despite the United States actions, commercial whaling continued and it
was evident from the significant drop in weight of the average caught
whale that whalers were hunting more immature whales-in 1932 the
average taken whale weighed sixty-seven tons; by 1978 the average was
twenty tons.30 2
The reason why the United States chose to become such an ardent
protector of whales is not entirely clear from the literature or the IWC
Annual Reports. While whaling was no longer an economic imperative for
the United States, it was not in its economic interest to threaten sanctions
against long-standing trading partners.3 3 It is arguable that the United
States might have gained a "reputational advantage" in being perceived
as a good environmental citizen.30 4 As Vogler argues, for states like the
United States, Great Britain, and France, opposing the taking of whales
was "a relatively cost-free way of establishing 'green' credentials" both
domestically and internationally, since none of these states had hunted
whales for decades. 30 5 However, the economic costs in pursuing such a
path were most likely greater than the potential reputational benefit since
it risked trade relations.0 6 Thus, some other factors must have been in
play beyond economic considerations.
importing marine mammal products unless a waiver had been granted. The Pelly
Amendment of that year also supported the broad strokes of the MMPA in that it allowed
the Secretary of Commerce to certify to the President actions such as sanctions against
foreign states that abrogated global nature conservation initiatives (provided such
sanctions were not prohibited under the then-existing General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT'")). Stephen S. Boynton, 'Whaling Policy" of the United States Yesterday,
Today and Tomorrow, ISANA, N. 11, 1994, available at http://luna.pos.to/whale/
jwa-vllboy.html. The threat to invoke the Pelly amendment by the U.S. government
saw the routine defiance of the IWC by whaling states over the previous decades become
a thing of the past by the mid-1970s. See Rose & Paleokrassis, supra note 161, at 169-70.
3
w See DESOMBRE, supra note 87, at 134.
30" See id.
302 APLIN, ET AL., supra note 167, at 239.
3w See PORTER, BROWN, & CHASEK, supra note 186, at 95.
o See D'Amato and Chopra, supra note 79, at 42.
See VOGLER, supra note 105, at 51.
306 See PORTER, BROWN, & CHASEK, supra note 186, at 95.
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By the 1979 meeting, the number of members attending the IWC
had grown to twenty-three, due in part to U.S. economic pressure on non-
member states that were whaling to attend. 0 7 The other factor in the
growth of new IWC members was the ENGOs' strategic plan to end
commercial whaling by adding new non-whaling members to the IWC in
order to tip the balance in favor of a moratorium and usher in a new era
of preservationism.' °s Realizing that moral persuasion was not working
quickly enough and that whale species were threatened with extinction,
ENGOs elected to act strategically." 9 Although never officially confirmed
by Greenpeace, a former Greenpeace consultant recounted that there was
a plan to add:
at least six new anti-whaling members from 1978 to 1982
through the paying of annual dues, drafting of membership
documents, naming of a commissioner to represent these
countries, at an annual cost of more than USD 150,000.310
However, Porter and Brown argue that the recruiting of anti-
whaling states was actually conducted by the United States, Sweden, and
other conservationist states.311 They maintain that the recruitment of the
Seychelles was followed by seven other states, all dedicated to the ideal
that the oceans and their resources should be viewed as "the common in-
heritance of mankind."" 2 While it is impossible to be certain which actors
put in place a plan to "stack" the IWC, an examination of the membership
list of that period reveals that this is in fact what happened, with coun-
tries like Switzerland and the Seychelles joining the IWC."'
There appears to be more evidence supporting the contention that
it was the ENGO strategy. Alongside the Greenpeace statements, it is
clear from the record that the Seychelles delegation appointed naturalist
307 INTL COMM'N ON WHALING, THIRTIETH REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 25 (1980). Sweden
and the Seychelles joined the IWC in 1979. Id.
... See Skodvin & Andresen, supra note 183, at 81. This was possible because, unlike the
Antarctic regime, there is no requirement that a state actively whale for it to become a
member of the IWC, which has led to such anomalies as landlocked Switzerland becoming
a member. See VOGLER, supra note 105, at 51-52.
" See Skodvin & Andresen, supra note 183, at 81.
1 Id. DeSombre tells a tale of an IWC secretary who alleges that an "unnamed member
state... simply signed over the check from an environmental organization to pay its
dues." Id.
311 See PORTER, BROWN, & CHASEK, supra note 186, at 95.
312 Id.
313 See id.; see also HIIGH NORTH WEB, supra note 285.
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Lyall Watson as their plenary delegate and marine biologist Sidney Holt
as the scientific committee member, both of whom were linked to ENGOs.314
Environmentalists maintain they recruited the Seychelles to their cause
as a counterbalance to Panama, which had been offered a sugar deal by
Japan that ENGOs feared would influence their IWC vote.315
In addition to their state infiltration strategy, the ENGOs planned
to assemble a three-quarter majority of anti-whaling nations to vote along
preservationist lines and ban whaling outright.31 Since they could not
match the incentives offered by states like Japan, they approached tradi-
tionally non-whaling states that they felt would be more easily persuaded
that banning whaling was the correct moral decision.3" ' One view is that
it was in the interests of these non-whaling states to join because it was
an easy way to acquire the kudos of being a good "green" international
citizen without suffering any economic costs. 38 However, doing so ignores
the work done by ENGOs to convince both state leaders and domestic
populations that whaling was morally repugnant.
At the 1979 IWC meeting Australia announced that its position
would be to prohibit whaling in its own waters and oppose the taking of
whales in international waters.319 The reasons cited by the Australian
delegation for this new direction were the probable high intelligence of
whales; an understanding that such actions were immoral and that meth-
ods of taking whales were inhumane; whaling products were economically
substitutable; and the survival of some whale species was in doubt, thus
requiring a "change in emphasis from one of the conservative utilization
of whale stocks to promoting a policy of banning whaling and protecting
whale populations."32 ° The emphasis on the intelligence of whales and on
the immorality of whaling is an indication that the ENGOs' publicity
campaign was affecting state direction and identity.
This meant that two traditional whaling states, the United States
and Australia, were now staunch advocates of a global commercial whaling
moratorium. United States President Jimmy Carter went so far as to send
314 See WEYLER, supra note 237, at 540-41.
315 Id.
316 See HIGH NORTH WEB, supra note 285; Gregory Rose, International Law and the Status
of Cetaseans, in THE CONSERVATION OF WHALES AND DOLPHINS: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE
30 (Mark P. Simmonds & Judith D. Hutchinson eds., 1996).317 See HIGH NORTH WEB, supra note 285 (citing Jan Bollwerk, Richard D. Morais, and
Leslie Spencer, The Not So Peaceful World of Greenpeace, FORBES, Nov. 11, 1991).
318 See Rose, supra note 315, at 30.319 See D'Amato and Chopra, supra note 79, at 42.
320Id.
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a letter asking the Commission to carry out "effective action to ensure the
survival of the great whales."32' It is clear that given the resources put into
the global moratorium that this was no mere strategic decision by the
United States and Australia, but rather symptomatic of a change in their
very identity, from passive bystanders to active norm proponents.
The early 1980s saw the idea of a global moratorium become the
central issue within the IWC, testing both its identity and future
direction.322 On the one side there were the states and ENGOs that es-
poused a preservationist creed and wanted "to ban all whaling, irrespec-
tive of whether a particular species is stable or endangered."323 Opposing
them was the whaling industry which, at best, favored a conservationist
perspective, but in reality had been exploiting whales for decades."2 Such
diametrically opposed positions meant whalers and preservationists were
unable to reach any accord, leading to an escalation in what became
known colorfully as "the whale wars."325
The thirty-second meeting of the IWC had twenty-four nations
(Oman and Switzerland having recently joined) in attendance, with three
moratorium proposals put up: "a worldwide moratorium, a moratorium on
commercial whaling, and a moratorium on sperm whaling."326 The
United States put forward a moratorium amendment to a proposal by
France and argued that it was necessary because the IWC had been un-
able to stop the over-exploitation of whale stocks.3 27 The amendment
failed, but the vote was close with thirteen votes in favor, nine against
and two abstentions.3 28 Iceland, Canada, and South Africa all spoke for the
need for a policy "which recognizes whales as a harvestable resource subject
to the needs of conservation."329 The global ban that had been promoted by
Australia in 1979 and that had been considered by an IWC working group
was rejected when the group's report argued such a course of action would
probably have adverse economic effects and would "result in the direct loss
of over 7,000 jobs and an indirect loss of over 35,000 jobs."3
321 Id.
322 See id. at 45.
321 Id. at 45.
324 See id.
3' D'Amato and Chopra, supra note 79, at 45.326 Id. at 43.
327 INT'L COMM'N ON WHALING, THmTY-FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 18-19 (1981).
328 Id.
32 Id. at 18.
330 Id. at 18-19.
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By the 1981 meeting, global interest in the issue of whaling rose
again, and the number of member nations within the IWC increased by 33
percent.33' New members, like Costa Rica and India, came out in favor of
whale preservation. 3 2 Despite the change in the composition of the mem-
bers, a call for a global ban on the taking of whales proposed by the United
Kingdom and supported by the United States, Sweden, France, and New
Zealand again did not pass at the 1981 meeting, with sixteen in favor,
eight against, and three abstentions. 333 Also unsuccessful were plans for
a ban in the North Atlantic, a ban on minke whaling, and a global phaseout
of commercial whaling over the next five years.3" The only proposal to
gain any traction was one put up by the United Kingdom, France, the
Netherlands, and the Seychelles, calling for a ban on the culling of sperm
whales, which had been hunted in such large numbers that they were
virtually extinct.335
At the 1982 meeting in Brighton, U.K., over thirty-seven members
of the IWC were present, including eight who had never had whaling in-
dustries, and fifty-one ENGOs.336 At that meeting, the IWC received five
moratorium proposals from the Seychelles,33 United Kingdom, United
States, France, and Australia.133 The Seychelles argued for a phase out of
commercial whaling, leading to a negotiated ban, because such an ap-
proach would "facilitate the adjustment that whaling nations will have to
make if the whale is to be saved from extinction, and at the same time
[would] safeguard the future work of the Commission as a growing alli-
ance of nations committed to preserving all cetaceans for posterity."
339
Japan argued that as per the Scientific Committee Reports, there was no
... See D'Amato and Chopra, supra note 79, at 44.
332 INT'L COMM'N ON WHALING, THIRTY-SEcOND REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 17 (1982).
3Id. at 18.334 Id.
335 Id. at 19-20.
336 See VOGLER, supra note 105, at 51.337 See HIGH NORTH WEB, supra note 285. The tiny island nation of Seychelles ended up
playing a critical role in the decision to impose a moratorium on whaling since the docu-
ment was introduced by that nation. Behind that flag of convenience were ENGOs de-
termined to push their own preservationist agenda at the IWC meeting. The Seychelles
delegation included Sidney Holt, a key player in the "Save-the-Whale" movement, who
had been chairman of Greenpeace U.K. and had been employed for ten years by the
International Fund for Animal Welfare ("IFAW"). In partnership with the director of
Greenpeace International, David McTaggart, they had worked tirelessly to recruit new,
non-whaling nations to the IWC. Id.
338 INT'L COMM'N ON WHALING, THIRTY-THIRD REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 20-21 (1983).
' See D'Amato and Chopra, supra note 79, at 45 (emphasis added).
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scientific basis for a blanket moratorium since some whale stocks had
replenished.3' Further, in Japan's eyes, such a move would be hypocritical
and contrary to the Convention since it would also ban traditional aborig-
inal subsistence whaling.3" Norway, Iceland and the Republic of Korea all
opposed the ban on scientific grounds.3" Uruguay, Mexico, Argentina,
Peru, Brazil, Chile, and Costa Rica supported a moratorium, but expressed
worries over the issue of the sovereign rights of coastal states to access
their resources within their two hundred mile exclusive economic zones.w
Australia argued that a moratorium would best balance the competing
interests of the whaling industry and the conservation of whales.'
The amendment was eventually passed twenty-five to seven with
five abstentions.' Whaling states were granted a three-year grace period
to phase out their hunts to lessen the economic impact of the moratorium
in order to comply with the IWC preamble.3" However, the ban exempted
aboriginal subsistence whaling-particularly the endangered bowhead
species, hunted by the Inuit in the Arctic regions.3"
The ENGO twin strategy of bringing in new non-whaling member-
states and publicizing the issue to the world, combined with the economic
pressure applied by the United States, tipped the balance within the IWC.
With the passing of the commercial whaling moratorium in 1982, to be-
come operational in 1986, preservationism became ascendant, if not totally
dominant, over both conservationism and exploitation.3' However, it was
not a clean victory. The moratorium was confined to commercial whaling
and it allowed exemptions if registered with the IWC, which countries like
Japan and Norway were quick to exploit.349 Japan immediately lodged
an objection under Article V(3) which allowed them to legally continue
whaling; Canada, an ardent whaler, left the IWC entirely.35 °
Peterson maintains that the passing of the moratorium, while a
victory for environmentalists in general, may not have been one for
those pushing a preservationist agenda since it "can be read as either
340 See INTL COMMN ON WHALING, supra note 337, at 21.l Id"
341 Id.
3" Id.
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conservationist or preservationist in inspiration."351' The arguments
made by the preservationist proponents within the IWC also reflect this
ambivalence. Preservationist proponents' arguments were never advanced
in terms of preserving whales." 2 Rather, these arguments were defended
within the IWC as providing a chance for whale stocks to rebound, which
left the door open for whaling to continue at a later date, which is consis-
tent with a conservationist position. 53 This, however, looks more like a
strategic decision by proponents to argue in terms they knew would be
acceptable to the other delegates.3M Proposing an indefinite ban would
most likely not have been accepted or would have split the IWC to the
point where many states would have left, destroying the regime.
States were willing to stop commercial whaling at this particular
point for many reasons. From a self-interested perspective, for many
states a declining demand globally for whale products had made whaling
a marginalized economic activity. The inexorable laws of supply and de-
mand allowed states to change their stance from pro- to anti-whaling at
minimal cost to their interests.355 Further, many non-whaling states sup-
ported a moratorium because of domestic political pressure to appease
voters who, thanks to the ENGO publicity campaign, perceived whaling
as a morally repugnant activity.356 Voting for the moratorium cost domestic
governments little strategically and appeased domestic voters.57
One must also consider the interest many states had in being seen
as a good international citizen, however, with the concomitant reputa-
tional advantage to states of being perceived as good global environmental
citizens. 35" Further, United States' threats to impose sanctions under the
Pelly Act had an important effect on convincing reluctant states to adhere
to the moratorium or risk losing lucrative export markets.359
The interest-based arguments ignore the fact that for many states
and their citizens there was great concern about declining whale numbers
and that many states acknowledged that whaling had been badly regu-
lated. 6 Also, a proper conservationist ethic had not taken hold either
351 See Peterson, supra note 4, at 148.
See M1YAOKA, supra note 256, at 92.
See Peterson, supra note 4, at 148.
See Skodvin & Andresen, supra note 183, at 81.
3 5 See DESOMBRE, supra note 87, at 140; see STOETT, supra note 102, at 59.
See DESOMBRE, supra note 87, at 140.
117 See Oberthuir, supra note 83, at 35.
f See PORTER, BROWN, & CHASEK, supra note 186, at 95.
'9 See Oberthiir, supra note 83, at 33; see DESOMBRE, supra note 87, at 136.
o See DESOMBRE, supra note 87, at 141.
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within the IWC or in the broader world.36' Further, some states-such as
Australia, the United States and the Netherlands-had come to accept
that whales had an intrinsic right to live.362 This altered their identity
within the global society. For these states and for most of the ENGOs,
whaling was a barbaric practice and the taking of even one whale was
anathema.3" These states have been at the forefront of strengthening the
commercial moratorium in the hopes of stopping the taking of any whales.4
The moratorium at least put an end to the large-scale exploitation
of whale stocks even if it had not ended whaling altogether.3" Rather, the
normative debate appeared to have become one of the proponents advo-
cating conservation or proselytising preservationism.366 The moratorium
subsequently saw a recovery in some whale species in certain areas. 67 For
example, in the cases of Southern California grey, blue and humpback
whale stocks rebounded.3" One of the most threatened species, the bow-
head whale, has seen a five-fold increase in species total from 1500 in 1976
to 7500.86 North Atlantic humpback whales increased in numbers from
5505 in the 1980s to approximately 11,000 by the mid 1990s.
370
IX. AMrER THE WHALING MORATORIUM
The granting of the moratorium did not end the normative contes-
tation within the IWC and globally as to the standard of behavior to be
applied to whales. In many ways the debate became more acrimonious as
positions hardened. The contest also shifted to other normative battle-
grounds both within and without the IWC. For the pro-whaling states the
battle to define the whaling regime was not over and they sought to "refocus
the whaling debate from a philosophical dilemma to the practical question
3' Id. at 139, 141.
362 Id. at 137-38, 140.
m See id.
36 See DESOMBRE, supra note 87, at 136.
m Id. at 140-41.
' See D'Amato and Chopra, supra note 79, at 42-45.
367 PETER J. BRYANT, BIODIVERSITY AND CONSERVATION: A HYPERTEXT BoOK, http'//www
.dbc.uci.edu/-sustain/bio65/lec07/b651ec07.htm#Recovery-of some-populations (last
visited Nov. 26, 2008).
3" Id.
N9 NATL PARK SERVICE, BERING LAND BRIDGE NATIONAL PRESERVE: BOWHEAD WHALES,
httpJ/www.nps.gov/archive/bela/html/bowhead.htm#top (last visited Nov. 26, 2008).
370 RAYMOND L. BRYANT & SINEAD BAILEY, THIRD WORLD POLITICAL ECOLOGY: AN
INTRODUCTION 3-4 (Routledge, 1997).
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of sustainable activity."371 While preservationism is now ascendant, it hangs
by a slim thread that is challenged yearly at IWC meetings by those
seeking to roll back the ban.372 The tactics and strategies used by the
ENGOs to bring about a moratorium have now been copied by states like
Japan to end the ban.
3 73
The whaling regime at this point can be modeled in game theoretic
terms in a number of ways. The actions of the coalition of pro-whaling states
indicate that the whaling regime is in a situation of "asymmetric deadlock,"
with whaling states having no intention of cooperating with other states to
preserve whales. 4 The same model could be applied to the preservationist
camp as well. Neither side has approached the negotiating table with a
willingness to compromise because no diminution of position is possible
given the moral and cultural belief structures at stake.
Given the coalition of pro-whaling states' previous behavior, there is
a need to be wary about the genuineness of its professed desire for con-
serving whales. However, it is arguable that these states learned that
their previous exploitative behavior led to this outcome, and therefore
learned to be genuine in their willingness to whale according to conserva-
tionist mores. The fact that this group violated the norm of preservation
does not detract from the veracity of the conservationist norm. It still exerts
a powerful effect on many states, defining their appropriate behavior and
constituting their identities, as well as the practices of many whalers.
Preservationist states and ENGOs have attempted to widen the
moratorium into a comprehensive ban on all whaling by creating whale
sanctuaries and encouraging whale watching enterprises, while other
states like Japan campaign to put in place ostensibly conservationist
programs.3 75 Despite the global social censure directed at Japan and its
allies for refusing to submit to the discursive outcome of the ban, the
coalition continues to flout the accepted standard in order to carry out
371 Kristen M. Fletcher, The International Whaling Regime and U.S. Foreign Policy, in
THE ENvIRONMENT, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLIcY 224 (Paul G
Harris ed., Georgetown University Press, 2002).
372 Leo Lewis, Japan Persuades Commission Whaling Ban Not Necessary, TIMES ONLINE,
June 19,2006, available at httpJ/www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article676344
.ece (last visited Nov. 26, 2008).373 Id.
374 See id.
375 See GREENPEACE, THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF WHALE SANcTUARIES, httpJ/archive.
greenpeace.org/oceans/whales/history.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2008).
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"scientific whaling."376 The remainder of this article will examine key actors
and issue flashpoints in the whaling saga to determine whether the norm
ofpreservationism has strengthened or weakened since the implementation
of the commercial ban on whaling.
Japan immediately registered an objection to the moratorium on the
grounds that the ban was not justified given the available scientific evi-
dence, a theme it has consistently pushed since then.377 Of the six remaining
active whaling states at that time, three filed formal objections to the
ban-Norway, Peru and the U.S.S.R., while three other nations, together
with one of the absentees-Brazil, Chile, Iceland and the Republic of
Korea, decided to take no action.37 At the meeting, Peru withdrew its
objection leaving only the three whaling nations of Norway, Japan and the
U.S.S.R. as formal objectors.379 This made the latter increasingly isolated.'
The United States then informed Norway and Japan that under the
Pelly Amendment it would seek to impose an embargo, banning the impor-
tation of their fish products to force them to comply with the IWC
decision.38 ' The United States was unable to use such pressures on the
U.S.S.R. since the United States did not import fish products from the
Soviet Union.8 2 The threat by the United States to impose sanctions was
not enacted however, since it was found to be illegal under the GATT-a
decision that eliminated a key weapon of coercion used to force states to
abide by IWC decisions.'
By 1986 Brazil agreed to abide by the moratorium and Japan
decided to stop commercial whaling activities by 1987." 4 The five-year
moratorium on commercial whaling was re-examined at the 1990 meeting,
but the Commission refused to change the moratorium's conditions.3"
D'Amato and Chopra believe that from this point in time, commercial
whaling of the larger whale species had become obsolete.' The situation is
376 See D'Amato and Chopra, supra note 79, at 48; Ruffle, supra note 191, at 651; see also
Peter Alford, Defeated Whalers Sense Tide Turning, THE AUSTRALIAN, June 25, 2005,
available athttp/www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,15722278-30417,00.htmI
(last visited Nov. 26, 2008).
311 INT'L COMM'N ON WHALING, THIRTY-FOURTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 13 (1984).
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more complex and not settled, however. States like Japan, Iceland and
Norway continue to hunt using the pretext of scientific research, or alter-
natively, refuse to recognize the authority of the IWC, thereby casting
themselves as rogue states in the eyes of much of the world. 7
Japan has emerged as the leader of a veto coalition determined to
roll back the moratorium, to prevent the ban from widening, and to replace
it with conservationist whaling practices.3s Japan appears to have learned
from its ENGO opponent's strategies; it has been accused by ENGOs of
attempting to "stack" the IWC by using the leverage of potential fishery
markets and aid money to convince South Pacific and Caribbean states to
join the organization. 9
Such allegations have been widely reported, such as the case of the
Solomon Islands and the Caribbean states reputedly receiving "aid money"
to support Japan at the IWC.39 Their voting records certainly indicate a pro-
whaling bias but this is not conclusive evidence in and of itself.39' The
Japanese deny such aid is linked to votes, and accusations of this nature
are impossible to prove given Japanese aid is distributed to over 150
states.392 The policy continues to this day.393 The Whale and Dolphin Conser-
vation Society reported that of the six new states to join since June 2004
37 See GREENPEACE, supra note 374.
3m ANDREW DARBY, HARPOONED: INTO THE HEART OF WHALING 212 (NSW: Allen & Unwin
2007).
389 Matthew Denholm, Push to Harpoon Ban on Whaling, THE AUSTRALIAN, January 21,
2005, at 3.
3' DARBY, supra note 387, at 213. St. Lucia and St. Vincent were the first in 1986 and a
year later fisheries grant aid began to flow into those States. Id.
391 INT'L FUND FOR ANIMAL WELFARE, JAPAN'S WHALE VOTE BUYING: UNDERMINING THE
IWC, http'//www.ifaw.org/ifaw-germany/join-Campaigns/protecting-whales-aroundthe
_world/at riskthe worldsforum for whales/international_whaling-commission_(iwc)/
japan's-whale-vote-buying-undermining-the-iwc.php (last visited Nov. 26, 2008).
During the 2005 IWC meeting there were again many allegations of Japan attempting to
buy votes. The Solomon Islands National Planning and Aid Coordination Minister Fred
Fono, reportedly agreed to support the Japanese position after meeting the Japanese
delegation, who offered the Solomon Islands an extended aid package of 39 million USD.
Peter Afford, Whaling Ban Faces Extinction, THE AUSTRALIAN, June 20, 2005, available
at http'//www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,15667505-2702,00.html (last
visited Nov. 26, 2008). Japan has recently been discovered paying the IWC's annual
levies on behalf of Grenada and the Solomon Islands. In the case of Grenada, support for
the Japanese position was bought, according to former IWC Commissioner, Micheal
Baptiste, for support of Grenada's fishing industry. Clay Lucas, Evidence of Whale Vote
Bribery, THE AGE, Jul. 18, 2005, at 4.
" See Afford, supra note 375, at 16.
'93 See DARBY, supra note 387, at 213-29.
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(Kiribati, Mali, Surinam, Tuvalu, Belgium and the Ivory Coast), only Bel-
gium voted against lifting the ban; thus giving the pro-whaling faction
potentially enough votes to overturn the ban and impose the revised man-
agement scheme."
Despite the attempts by Japan to overturn the moratorium, it has
continued to be applied since Japan has not yet rallied the two-thirds
majority to overturn it. 3s5 However, Japan is playing a long diplomatic
game to achieve their objectives.3
X. CONTESTING THE DEFINITION OF "CONSERVATION" IN THE ICRW
The Japan-led veto coalition has tried to change the terms of the
debate linguistically in arguing for a clearly understood definition of the
term "conservation."397 They seek to define and limit the debate over the
direction of the IWC to terms more favorable to themselves.39 If Japan and
its allies can limit and define the normative contest within the IWC to one
of only debating conservationist mores and practices, it knows that it has
an excellent chance of eventually being allowed to whale legally again.3 At
the thirty-sixth meeting of the IWC in 1984 in Argentina, Japan and the
U.S.S.R. both argued that the 1946 Convention clearly spoke of the con-
sumptive uses of whales to ensure a greater emphasis on conservation of
whale stocks and greater IWC policy responsiveness. 
°0
At the 1986 IWC meeting, the U.S.S.R. (supported by representa-
tives from Norway, Iceland and Japan) proposed that the 1946 Convention
be revised to better reflect both scientific research and conservation
mores." ° New Zealand, representing the anti-whaling forces, opposed the
need for such a review, noting that the Convention had proved capable of
evolution to meet "changing conditions," a view supported by the United
States, Sweden, and West Germany.4"2 Since there was no consensus
achieved, the Chairman decided to retain the item on the agenda for the
" See Denholm, supra note 388, at 3.










WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POVr REV.
next meeting to allow governments to evaluate this matter further.' In
1987 the U.S.S.R. proposed that a special working group be established to
consider the issue, one that would meet in November/December 1987 and
was agreed to by the members.'
The tensions between the conservationist-arguing states and the
preservationist-leaning nations flared again at the thirty-ninth annual
meeting when the Working Group to Examine Questions Related to the
Operation of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling,
created at the previous meeting, met. 5 The issues raised by the working
group included the operation of the convention and whether it needed to be
revised-particularly whether the convention should focus more on con-
servation.4"6 However, other members, not identified in the Chairman's
Report, argued that the current convention was sufficient and there was no
pressing need to alter the convention at this time, if ever. 7 The Working
Group met annually but never seemed to make progress in its stated aims,
due to intransigence by preservationist states.40 8 By the forty-second meet-
ing the U.S.S.R. was complaining that the issue was not being debated
seriously and that the progress to date was unacceptable. 409
At the forty-third meeting the issue of the operation of the conven-
tion was revisited.4 0 Again the same fault lines were present with states
like Japan and Norway arguing that the IWC had departed significantly
from the original convention. 41' The anti-whaling coalition states argued
that change was unwarranted since there were no fundamental changes in
403 INT'L WHALING COMM'N, 37 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION 10 (1987).
404 INT'L WHALING COMM'N, 38 ANNuAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION 10 (1988).
405 INT'L WHALING COMM'N, 39 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION 10 (1989). The membership of the Committee comprised both preservation-
ist and conservationist states including representatives from Australia, Brazil, People's
Republic of China, Denmark, Iceland, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, New Zealand,
Norway, Seychelles, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, and the
United States. Id.406 Id.
407 Id.
408 Id.
409 IN'L WHALING COMM'N, 41 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION 11 (1991).
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circumstances or to existing international law.412 After much debate at the
Plenary discussion, it was agreed to create terms of reference for the work-
ing group to enable it to initiate a thorough review and, with the advice
of experts, to ascertain those parts of the schedule that needed
altering.413 The group was to report to the IWC by October 31, 1991.414
Japan continued to press for adherence to conservation protocols, but at the
1993 meeting in Kyoto, it was dealt a severe blow when the working group
decided it could not proceed until the Revised Management Scheme
("RMS") was implemented. 4" To this day implementation of the RMS has
not occurred and just prior to the 2006 meeting the Japanese, after years of
anguish and deadlock, declared that, for them, the RMS was dead. 16
In response, preservationist states have attempted to control the
terms of the debate by using conservation rhetoric against whaling states
to undermine their arguments. Both sides to the debate have used con-
servationist rhetoric for their own ends rather than actually discussing
exploitation and preservation.4 17 The IWC meeting in Mexico in 2003 saw
Mexico introduce a draft Resolution: The Berlin Initiative on Strengthening
the Conservation Agenda of the International Whaling Commission.4 18 It
aimed to create a Conservation Committee (with appropriate funding)
composed of all contracting parties to the Convention, to provide the insti-
tutional structure to examine conservation issues and to overcome what
Mexico saw as the "stagnation" of the IWC.419
Australia argued that such a resolution was a milestone in the
evolution of the organization. 42' New Zealand posited that the resolution had
the potential to meet the obligations imposed by the preamble to protect
412 INT'L WHALING COMM'N, 42 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION 11 (1992).
413 Id. app. 1 at 46.
414 Id.
415 INTL WHALING COMM'N, 44 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION 11 (1994).
411 See DARBY, supra note 387, at 240.
417 INT'L WHALING COMM'N, 55 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION (2004).
418 INTL WHALING COMM'N, 54 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION (2003).
419 Id. at 7-8. Mexico moved the motion on behalf of the co-sponsors Australia, Brazil,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Portugal, San Marino, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United
States. See INT'L WHALING COMM'N, 55 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION 7 (2004).420 Id.
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whale stocks for future generations." The United States, which was in
support of the proposal, maintained that the proposal was not necessarily
anti-whaling and supported the draft.4 Ireland hoped that such an entity
could reinvigorate the moribund Revised Management Scheme debate.4 2
However, the traditional whaling states and their allies all spoke out
against the proposal.' Denmark was concerned that the resolution did not
consider the role played by the North Atlantic Marine Mammals Commis-
sion ("NAMMCO") (a rival entity set up by Scandinavian whaling states)
and gave too much power to ENGOs to set IWC priorities.425 Iceland,
Norway, the Republic of Korea, Antigua and Barbuda, China, Dominica, the
Russian Federation, Japan, Grenada, St. Lucia, and Morocco were all
opposed to the creation of such an entity, arguing that it would "create a
radical and lasting change in the character of the IWC."426
However, the resolution was adopted with 25 votes in favor and 20
against.427 In closing the debate, the Chair argued that "the establishment
of the Conservation Committee would not solve the problems within [sic]
IWC" and stressed the need to continue to work to find a balance between
conservation and preservation, without directly referring to this balance in
these terms.4' The problems the Chair alluded to appear to be intractable,
with neither faction willing to engage in a legitimate dialogue.4'
At the fifty-sixth meeting the Conservation Committee met for the
first time.' ° The Annual Report states that the IWC delegates all agreed
they "were committed to conservation" but the term is not defined in the
report in any coherent way." While the Committee did discuss the issue in
conservationist terminology (for example what constitutes "sustainable
use"), it felt it could not give a definitive answer at that point in time. 2
Other pro-whaling states were concerned the term would not be examined
421 Id.
422 Id.
423 Id. at 8-9.
4
14 Id. At this time the veto coalition included Denmark, Iceland, Norway, the Republic
ofKorea, Antigua and Barbuda, China, Dominica, Russia, Japan, Grenada, St. Lucia and
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43' INTL WHALING COMMN, supra note 418, at 64-65.
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in the context of achieving "the orderly development of the whaling in-
dustry," which, for them, was the key aim.' At the same meeting Japan
attempted to regain the policy initiative by giving a presentation to the
other members under the heading The Centennial ofAntarctic Whaling-
From the History of Over-Harvesting to the Creation of New Sustainable
Whaling.' The presentation focused on learning from what Japan re-
garded as past mistakes in the region to create a new, sustainable re-
gime." The paper provided a contextual argument highlighting Japan's
traditional whaling culture and how various legal instruments state the
need for the full utilization ofwhales." 6 It concluded with an analysis of how
whaling should be conducted in the future and how any Revised Manage-
ment Procedure ('"MP") should reflect the ICRW's original objectives. It
defended the practice of scientific whaling as necessary and argued that the
whales taken should be fully "utilized" by being used as a food source." 7
Japan requested that this item be placed on the agenda for future
meetings." 8 Although the Chair acquiesced, to date the issue has not
proceeded any further." 9 Pro-whaling states have been unable to get anti-
whaling states to agree to their preferred version of conservation, either
rhetorically or in practice."
At the 2006 IWC meeting, Japan looked to "normalizing" relations
within the IWC and responded with the "St. Kitts and Nevis Declaration"
which demanded a return to a literal interpretation of the ICRW and its
conservationist principles, as well as a rejection of the ban."' If Japan
passed this motion it could argue that a majority-but not a three-quar-
ters majority-wanted a resumption of commercial whaling. The vote was
on a knife's edge until the Senegalese Commissioner turned up to vote .42
The vote was 33 for, 32 against and one abstention, and, for the first time in





43 INT'L WHALING COMM'N, supra note 418, at 64-65.438 Id.
43 Id. at 67-68.440 Id.
441 INT'L WHALING COMM'N, 57 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION 1 (2006).
4 Id. Curiously, after the vote the Senegalese President said he was unaware of the vote.
Id.
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forces had lost.' After the St. Kitts conference, Japan set up a "normaliza-
tion meeting" to put whaling on a "proper course," which was shunned by
preservationist states and a report was submitted to the IWC, but there has
been no action to date on the issues discussed."
At the 2007 IWC meeting in Anchorage, Alaska, the Conservation
Committee met but again could not agree on establishing the terms of
reference with the Chair deciding to try to deal with the issue before the
next meeting in Chile.' When the Committee met in Chile in 2008, it again
did not consider the RMS issue.'
Instead, the issues facing the Conservation Committee have been
subsumed under the broader remit of the inter-sessional Meeting on the
Future of the International Whaling Commission, which met for the first
time in London in March 2008." The Inter-sessional Meeting, hosted by the
Chair of the IWC, Bill Hoggarth of the United States, is tasked with over-
coming the polarized nature of the IWC and putting forward suggestions to
improve practice and procedures with the overall aim of rebuilding trust
in the organization.'4 The IWC has agreed to continue negotiations on the
substantive issues raised by the inter-sessional meeting. 9 However, given
the impasse at the last few meetings between conservationist and
preservationist forces, it seems unlikely that this mechanism can resolve the
normative tensions between the two camps.
"3 See id. at 64-65; DARBY, supra note 387, at 243-44.
" INT'L WHALING COMM'N, 2007 CONFERENCE FOR THE NORMALIZATION OF THE
INTERNATIONALWHALING COMMISSION 5, 10 (2007) available at http://www.iwcoffice.org/
_documents/commission/IWC59docs/59-7.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2008); DARBY, supra
note 387, at 245.
445 INT'L WHALING COMM'N, 58 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION 11 (2007).
"46 See generally INT'L WHALING COMM'N CONSERVATION COMMITTEE, REVISED DRAFT
AGENDA FOR THE 60TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION
2008, IWC/60/CC 1REV, available at http.//www.iwcoffice.org/_documents/commission/
IWC60docs/60-CClrev.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2008).
47 INTL WHALING COMM'N, CHAIR'S REPORT OF THE INTERSESSIONAL MEETING OF THE
FUTURE OF IWC 1, 8-11, available at httpJ/www.iwcoffice.org/ documents/commission/
IWC60docs/60-7.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2008).
4Id. at8.
"9 INT'L WHALING COMM'N, CHAIR'S SUMMARY OF THE OUTCOME OF DISCUSSIONS ON THE
FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION, IWC/60/24 at 1, available at
httpY/www.iwcoffice.org/_documents/commission/IWC60docs/60-24.pdf(last visited Nov. 29,
2008).
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XI. IWC SCIENTIFIC PERMrrs AND WHALING
Scientific permits have been a particularly bitterly fought topic
between preservationist-minded states and those states dedicated to
continuing whaling.45 ° Under the ICRW, states are allowed to issue their
own scientific permits to hunt whales and the IWC has few powers to
prevent such permits for activities it might regard as scientifically
dubious-a loophole whaling states have ruthlessly exploited.451
Preservationist states have attempted over the years to tighten the regu-
lations pertaining to the issuance of individual states' scientific permits,
but in the face of the intransigence of states such as Japan and Norway,
they have, to date, been unsuccessful.452
Japan, Iceland, Russia, and Norway have continued to award
themselves scientific permits in the face of global condemnation of the
twisting of the term "scientific." 3 They have justified this decision on the
grounds that whale numbers for certain species have recovered enough for
such activities, or, alternatively, that killing whales is necessary to better
understand them.4 ' For preservationist-minded states these explanations
appear dubious and are perceived as attempts to circumvent the morato-
rium." However, under the rules of the ICRW, states are allowed their own
scientific programs and so the skeptics have been limited to calls to stop
such activities. 6
Following from the IWC meeting that imposed the moratorium in
1985, Japan argued at the Joint Working Group of the Technical and Scien-
tific Committees-chaired by Japan-that there was a need to create better
conceptual approaches. 7 The Japanese argued the aim should be to better
inform the IWC with effective scientific advice and recommendations, as well
as set out timetable for a detailed assessment of whale stocks.' The report
" See Rose & Paleokrassis, supra note 161, at 157.
451 Id.
452 See Rose, supra note 315, at 39.
453 Id. at 38-39.45 4 Id. For example, in the 1987/88 season Japan undertook a research program with the
nebulous aim of better understanding the population dynamics of minke whales in
Antarctica which apparently means killing three hundred whales a year. See Stroud,
supra note 115, at 68-70.
" See Rose & Paleokrassis, supra note 161, at 157.
456Id.
457 See INT'L WHALING COMM'N, supra note 399, at 9.
458Id.
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was accepted by the commission and this acceptance has allowed Japan and
other whaling states to argue that scientific whaling is necessary. 9
Preservationist states have continually clashed with whaling states
in a number of meetings over the regulation of scientific permits. At the
1985 IWC meeting there was vigorous debate as to whether such catches
should be allowed to enter into international trade and whether special
permit catches should be allowed from protected stocks.' A new resolution
was adopted by consensus, whereby IWC members agreed to carry out
research, wherever feasible, through non-lethal methods and with the goal
of rational management of whale stocks."'
Following the 1986 decision to review special permits, Iceland, the
Republic of Korea, and Japan all submitted proposals to be allowed to catch
whales under a scientific permit. 2 All three requests were turned down by
the IWC, citing, in the case of Korea, that it would not contribute informa-
tion that answers significant management questions, while arguing that
Iceland's request did not meet the 1986 criteria.' Japan was asked not to
take whales, while the Scientific Committee examined Japan's proposed
research methods.' The following year both Norway and Iceland applied
for special permits but both applications were rejected by the IWC.4
At the forty-first meeting, Iceland stated it would not seek scientific
permits to hunt sei whales, as it had lost faith in the IWC as an organiza-
tion.' Japan, Norway, and initially the Soviet Union sought official per-
mission to kill whales for scientific purposes but have found themselves
consistently refused by the other delegates. 7 At the forty-fifth meeting,
459 Id. at 10.
46 See IN'L WHALING COMM'N, supra note 402, at 11.
461 Id. at 25.
462 See INT'L WHALING COMM'N, supra note 403, app. 2-4 at 28-29.
"3 Id.
' Id. app. 4 at 29.
45See INT'L WHALING COMM'N, supra note 404, app. 1,2 at 30-31.
466See INT'L WHALING COMM'N, supra note 408.
467 INT'L WHALING COMM'N, 40 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION 36 (1989); INTL WHALING COMM'N, supra note 408, app. 1,2 at 47-48; INT'L
WHALING COMM'N, supra note 411, app. 1,2 at 46-47; INTL WHALING COMM'N, 43 ANNuAL
REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION 49 (1992); INT'LWHALING COMM',
supra note 414, at 33; INT'LWHALING COMM'N, 45 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
WHALING COMMISSION 29 app. 7 (Resolution 1996-7) (1994); INT'L WHALING COMMN, 47
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION 51-52 app. 6 (Resolution
1997-6) (1996); INTL WHALING COMM'N, 48 ANNuAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
WHALING COMMISSION 47-48 app. 2 (IWC Resolution 1998-1) (1997); INVL WHALING
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Norway decided not to ask for a scientific permit leaving Japan isolated as
the only state still claiming that whaling is a scientific activity."
In the 1990s the preservationist states sought to limit scientific
research carried out by IWC members to research that primarily uses non-
lethal means. 4 s In 1995 the United Kingdom,-acting on the behalf of
Australia, Brazil, France, Netherlands, New Zealand, Oman, South Africa
and the United States-introduced a resolution that research should be
conducted primarily by non-lethal methods, and lethal methods should only
be used in "exceptional" circumstances, in order to address vitally important
scientific questions.47 °
There was much debate about the meaning of "exceptional."47' St.
Vincent and the Grenadines argued this was a moral issue and wondered
what made whales so special that they should not be killed.472 India re-
sponded that, in its particular case, it did not carry out lethal research on
tigers, elephants, lions and rhinos.473 Upon being put to a vote, the reso-
lution passed.474
At the fiftieth meeting the IWC members passed a resolution on
whaling under special permit which regretted that Japan was still carrying
out lethal research and recommended that whales taken should be done in
a manner consistent with Section III of the Schedule.475 At the fifty-fifth
annual meeting the IWC isolated Japan even further when as an entity it
"expressed deep concern that the provision permitting special permit
whaling enables countries to conduct whaling for commercial purposes
despite the moratorium on commercial whaling... [and that doing so was]
COMM'N, 49 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION 42 app. 4
(Resolution 1999-3) (1998); INT'L WHALING COMM'N, 50 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION 52-52 (Resolution 2000-4, Resolution 2000-5)
(1999); INT'L WHALING COMM'N, 51 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION 56 (Resolution 2001-7, 2001-8) (2000); INTL WHALING COMM'N, 52 ANNuAL
REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION 57 (2001).
4G8 See INT'L WHALING COMM'N, 45 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION, supra note 467, at 29.







474 Id. (23 for, 5 against, and 2 abstentions).
475 See INT'L WHALING COMM'N, 49 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION, supra note 467, app. 5 at 43.
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contrary to the spirit of the moratorium on commercial whaling and to the
will of the Commission."
476
Despite being virtually alone within the IWC, Japan continues
to take whales for "scientific purposes" over the objections of other IWC
members.477 Japan's decision to continue its program has seen it subjected
to global censure.47 Despite its continued intransigence, the fact that it
continues whaling in small numbers does not invalidate the preservationist
norm. Quite the contrary, Japan stands out as the exception that proves the
norm, which is becoming more deeply entrenched among IWC members.
XII. THE "IRISH PROPOSAL" FOR THE FUTURE OF THE IWC
In an attempt to break the conservationist/preservationist deadlock,
Irish Commissioner Michael Canny was asked at the forty-ninth IWC
meeting to consult with the other Commissioners regarding the Irish
Proposal with the goal of reaching a consensus among members.479 The
Proposal would allow coastal whaling to resume once again, but still con-
tinue to ban whaling on the high seas.' As a trade-offto the preservationist
forces, whaling for "scientific purposes" and the global trade in whale
commodities would also be forbidden under the proposal."' The submission
stipulated that whaling "should be restricted to coastal areas only" but it is
unclear as to how it would define "coastal."' 2
Ireland could not put forward a formal proposal at the next meeting,
however, because the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia
supported the strict moratorium. 4 3 The only exception members were
476 INT'L WHALING COMM'N, 54 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION, supra note 417, at Summary of Decisions and Required Action.
477 INT'L WHALING COMM'N, 59 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION, RESOLUTION 2007-1: RESOLUTION ON JARPA, available at http://www
.iwcoffice.org/Meetings/resolutions/resolution2007.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2008).
47 See generally Andrew C. Revkin, Japan Widens Whale Hunt, Provoking Objections,
N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2000.
479 INT'L WHALING COMM'N, 49 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION, supra note 467, at 35.
480 Id. at 36.
481Id.
4 2 Id. The submission does not make it apparent whether it is it the 200 nautical mile
Exclusive Economic Zones, the 12 nautical mile fisheries limit, or the 4 nautical mile
territorial zones.
483 See INTL WHALING COMM'N, 49 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION, supra note 467, at 35.
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willing to entertain was that of aboriginal whaling.' At this fiftieth meet-
ing of the IWC, debate ensued, and it was clear that there was a vast gulf
in views between the two factions.' Brazil declared that it wished to see a
South Atlantic Ocean Sanctuary created while Denmark argued that the
need to preserve whale stocks was critical.' 6 Japan was dismissive of this
argument, countering that the "IWC has turned into an organization to
protect whales, whereas it should consider the sustainable use of ocean
resources and the total ecosystem."* 7
At the fifty-first meeting, in a debate over the Irish proposal,
Norway argued that the IWC was not adhering to its Convention and
had become "a protectionist organization with no will to lift the morato-
rium."' Denmark thought that both sides must give up something to keep
the organization functioning. 9 The United Kingdom wanted to see a
permanent global ban except for aboriginal subsistence whaling, and that
whale watching as "a benign and sustainable way of exploiting natural
resources" was a better way forward.4' Japan chided the United Kingdom
for talking in terms of "conservation" when new whaling sanctuaries were
annually proposed and a coalition of preservationist states were implacably
opposed to whaling.49' At the fifty-second IWC meeting the Chair reported
that, despite there not yet being consensus, there was at least support for
a process with the aim of reaching compromise.492
However, the Irish compromise has exposed the real positions of
IWC states behind their negotiating stances. States like the United States
and the United Kingdom, which had opposed the resumption of whaling on
ethical grounds, but couched their rhetoric in scientific terms, were met
with a plan that would meet their stated scientific goals.493 If the RMS were




4" See id. at 36.
INT'L WHALING COMM'N, 50 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION, supra note 467, at 42.
489 Id.
490 Id.
491 Id. at 43.
492 INT'L WHALING COMM'N, 51 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION, supra note 467, at 50.
413 See DESOMBRE, supra note 87 at 142.
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whaling, would be forced to concede their true intentions.4" Given that
neither side wants the compromise implemented fully, it appears the
proposal has failed to break the normative impasse, and to date it has not
been implemented.495
XIII. ABORIGINAL SUBSISTENCE WHALING
An analysis of the case of aboriginal subsistence whaling is critical
when examining the normative debate underlying the IWC because it raises
three issues.4' The first issue is best phrased as a question: how strong can
the preservationist norm within the IWC be if whales are still killed under
the pretext of aboriginal subsistence whaling? If whaling still continues,
even with only a few taken, then the preservationist norm has not been fully
entrenched but is limited in its application.
The second issue is the attempt by pro-whaling states (particularly
those with indigenous populations) to continue to push for the expansion of
the ambit of such activities. Countries like Japan and Norway have at-
tempted to use this issue as a wedge to reopen the broader issue of com-
mercial whaling, arguing that some of their traditional cultural activities
should fall under this category.497 Meanwhile, the United States, which
opposed commercial whaling has sought to sanction such whaling since it
has a large indigenous population which has hunted whales for centuries.4"
494 Id.
495 Id. There is no mention of the issue being discussed at all at the 2007 meeting in Alaska
or in the 2008 meeting in Chile and it appears to have been allowed to lapse. See INT'L
WHALING COMM'N, 58 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION 1
(2007); INT'L WHALING COMM'N, 59 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION 1 (2008).
496 As per the IWC's ad hoc Committee Working Group on Development of Management
Principles and Guidelines for Subsistence Catches of Whales by Indigenous (Aboriginal)
Peoples, aboriginal subsistence whaling is defined as "for purposes of local aboriginal
consumption carried out by or on behalf of aboriginal indigenous, or native peoples who
share strong community, familial, social and cultural ties related to continuing traditional
dependence on whaling and on the use of whales." INT'L WHALING COMM'N, 46 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION: 'COMMERCIAL' VS. 'SUBSISTENCE,'
'ABORIGINAL' VS. 'NONABORIGINAL,' AND THE CONCEPT OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN
THE CONTEXT OF JAPANESE COASTAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 4 (1994). Conversely, the
IWC has never defined the term "commercial whaling," thus any practice not considered
to be "aboriginal subsistence" is deemed commercial. Reeves, supra note 134, at 76.
"' See John Vidal and Justin McCurry, Japan Sets Course for Return to Commercial
Whaling, THE GUARDIAN, May 30, 2006, available at http'//www.guardian.co
.uk/environment/2006/may/30/whaling.food (last visited Dec. 16, 2008).498 See D'Amato and Chopra, supra note 79, at 42.
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The United States has sought to defend their interests within the IWC
despite being one of the main sponsors of the moratorium against com-
mercial whaling.'
The third issue raised is the normative confusion over this issue
adopted by states like the United States as well as the various ENGOs.
Despite its staunch opposition to commercial whaling, the United States
has also been a supporter of aboriginal whaling, chiefly for its own domestic
reasons, differentiating it from industrial whaling.' ENGOs have also been
strangely quiet on this issue, not wishing to offend aboriginal organizations
whose rights they have traditionally supported in other forums.501 Their
silence on the issue, however, undercuts their moral persuasiveness in the
eyes of their opponents and to some extent, the rest of the world. The vexed
issue of aboriginal subsistence whaling is one that preservationist groups
must come to terms with by declaring which set of rights is more important,
aboriginal group rights or the intrinsic right of whales to exist.
The rights of aboriginal groups have been enshrined for decades
within the IWC. Initially, the right to hunt was felt to be a narrow one and
was designed to help indigenous peoples whose economy and culture was
based on the traditional hunt for whales." 2 In 1964, after a submission by
the United States to the IWC, Paragraph Two of the Schedule was revised
to forbid aboriginal hunting unless for local consumption in order to avoid
abuse of the rights of aboriginal groups by commercial interests.' In 1981,
just prior to the imposition of the moratorium, but at the height of discus-
sion about taking whales, it was agreed by the contracting members to the
IWC that the three broad management objectives for the aboriginal subsis-
tence whaling scheme would be
(1) to ensure that the risks of extinction to individual stocks
are not seriously increased by aboriginal whaling;
(2) to enable aboriginal people to harvest whales in perpe-
tuity at levels appropriate to their cultural and nutritional
requirements, subject to the other objectives; and
499Id.
11 Id.
" See The Wilderness Soc'y, Wilderness Protection and Native Title Policy (Queensland),
available at http'//www.indig-enviro.asn.au/Support22.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2008).
' See Fletcher, supra note 370, at 221.
50 INT'L COMMN ON WHALING, SIXTEENTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 20 (1964).
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(3) to maintain the status of whale stocks at or above the
level giving the highest net recruitment and to ensure that
stocks below that level are moved towards it, so far as the
environment permits.'
It is clear that the IWC always meant aboriginal whaling to be a
legitimate exemption to the overall commercial ban, provided that such
activities did not threaten the survival of whale species. °5 Over the years
the IWC has designated the following whaling operations as qualifying for
aboriginal subsistence whaling: the Greenland hunt for minke and fin
whales; the hunt for humpback whales in the Lesser Antilles; and for
bowhead and gray whales in Alaska, and gray whales in Russia.' In the
1990s bowhead whaling in Chukotka, Russia and gray whales by the
Makah in the U.S. state of Washington were also authorized.'
The United States in particular has traditionally stated that it
supports the concept of aboriginal subsistence whaling when applied to its
own citizens, following the IWC formulation "when it does not negatively
impact whale stocks and when the hunt fulfils nutritional, spiritual, and
cultural needs of a traditional whaling people."' This has in theory been
applied to the Inuit-comprising the indigenous peoples of Arctic Can-
ada, Alaska, Greenland and Siberia-who have also, in previous centuries,
hunted whales for food as a means of survival.'
In 1996 the United States went to the IWC on the Makah's behalf
but it was met with animosity."' 0 When it became clear that it would not
gather the required three quarter majority, the United States withdrew the
motion."1' In 1997 the United States tried again without success so they
arranged a deal with Russia to effectively trade quotas that enabled the
504 INT'L WHALING COMM'N TECHNICAL COMM. WORKING GROUP, THE REPORT OF THE
TECHNICAL COMMITTEE WORKING GROUP ON DEVELOPMENT OF MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES
AND GUIDELINES FOR SUBSISTENCE CATCHES OF WHALES BY INDIGENOUS (ABORIGINAL)
PEOPLES IN REPORTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION: SPECIAL ISSUE 4:
ABORIGINAI/SUBSISTENCE WHALING (WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE ALASKA AND
GREENLAND FISHERIES) 84 (1982).
See generally id.
o Reeves, supra note 134, at 77.
507Id.
s See Fletcher, supra note 370, at 217.
o See D'Amato and Chopra, supra note 79, at 58.510 THE HUMANE SOCIETY, MAKAH: THE TRIBE WHO WOULD BE WHALERS, httpJ/www.hsus
.org/marine-mammalswhat are the issueswhaling/makahthetribewhowouldbe
_whalers/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2008).511 Id.
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Makah to hunt.512 Most IWC members denounced this arrangement. 13
Their sentiments are best summarized by the Australian delegate who
argued that "[tihe only aboriginal people who are authorized to take Gray
whales are those whose traditional aboriginal subsistence and cultural
needs have been recognized." 14
At the forty-eighth IWC annual meeting the United States put
forward a request from the Makah tribe to be allowed to catch five gray
whales.51 The United States stipulated that it had an agreement with the
Makah tribe that there would be no commercial whaling and that the
request conformed to the criteria for an aboriginal subsistence quota.516
France and the Netherlands opposed the motion, with France asking how
it could be a cultural event if modern technologies were to be used and
whether the Makah arrangement met the definition of subsistence if the
tribe had managed for seventy years without hunting whales.5"7 The
Netherlands was concerned whether this request met the current definition
of aboriginal subsistence whaling and questioned the Makah tradition,
citing that their whaling had been of a commercial nature.51 Further dis-
cussion exposed that there was clear division on this issue with Japan, the
Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation supporting the proposal, but
many other members (Australia, Spain, Chile, New Zealand, China and
Mexico) opposing the motion.519 Before it could be put to a vote the item
was adjourned in favor of informal discussions. 520
At the fifty-fourth IWC meeting the issue was again raised.52" ' The
United States and Russia jointly proposed to renew the existing aboriginal
subsistence whaling quota for hunting bowhead whales for the next five
years.522 After fierce debate the motion was defeated, as it did not reach the




"' See D'Amato and Chopra, supra note 79, at 22-23.
515 INT'L WHALING COMM'N, 47 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING






521 INT'L WHALING COMM'N, 53 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION, supra note 417, at 19-22.
522 Id.
" Id. (32 for, 11 against, 2 abstentions).
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preservationist states that voted down the motion.5'2 The vote appears to
have been an example of payback by whaling states with Japan leading a
coalition of states arguing that aboriginal whaling was the "moral" equiva-
lent of Japanese small-type coastal whaling, and if that was not allowed
then aboriginal whaling should also be banned.5" Despite the setback, the
United States has still authorized the Makah to take whales domestically.526
Doing so undercut their moral legitimacy, however, and allowed states
such as Japan, Iceland, and Norway to argue for increased whaling
through the device of aboriginal whaling.527
With indigenous peoples' populations rebounding in certain areas,
particularly in the United States and Siberia, there is a growing demand by
these parties to take whales.5" There are concerns that such groups may
potentially hunt in commercial quantities and undermine the mora-
torium. 29 This has placed some anti-whaling states with indigenous popu-
lations in a terrible quandary, as well as ENGOS who have traditionally
supported indigenous rights.53 ° D'Amato and Chopra are rightly critical of
leading ENGOs such as the Sierra Club and Friends of the Earth, which
have been silent on the issue of protecting the endangered bowhead whale
because they are hamstrung by their support for the rights of indigenous
peoples."l
Their silence runs the danger of undercutting their authority
as norm teachers, leaving them open to accusations of hypocrisy by
524 Id.
525 id.
526 See Fletcher, supra note 370, at 225.
527 Id. By allowing the Makah hunt, the United States has created a new, permissible type
of whale killing called "cultural whaling," for those aboriginal people with a cultural
desire to hunt but not a subsistence need. Despite its actions on aboriginal whaling the
United States still argues it holds the position of being anti-whaling, and the United
States' public supports this position. Id. at 227-28.
528 Id.
5
' Richard Black, Greenland Whale Hunt "Commercial,' BBC NEWS, June 17,2008, http'J/
newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/sciencetnature/7458155
.stm (last visited Dec. 17, 2008).
'o See Rose, supra note 315, at 41.
' See D'Amato and Chopra, supra note 79, at 58. With its emphasis on a biocentric
approach to the planet, Greenpeace in particular has a problem since its ethos as the
"warriors of the rainbow" draws on the mythology of the Inuit tribe of Alaska. Frank
Zelko, "Make it a Green Peace". The History of an International Environmental
Organization, GHI BULLETIN, No. 34, Spring 2004, at 131, available at http/www.ghi-dc.
org/publications/ghipubs/bu034l34.127.pdf.
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pro-whaling forces. Rather than being drawn into a moral and public battle
they may not be able to win, most ENGOs have avoided the issue. Instead,
they have supported the right of aboriginal groups with a long history of
whaling to continue, provided that the whales being hunted are not en-
dangered and that precautionary monitoring and management protocols are
in place.5 32 This tension raises the bigger question of whether support for
aboriginal whaling necessarily undermines the preservationist norm as a
whole. The IWC and its member nations have always recognized the right
of indigenous groups to hunt whales in their traditional manner, so does
this mean the norm of preservationism is limited, and if so, by how much?
While it is arguable that the practice of aboriginal subsistence
whaling could be said to undermine the preservationist norm, one tightly
circumscribed exception in this regard does not negate the fact that the
majority of states seem implacably opposed to the taking of whales on a
commercial level. Preservationist leaning states may eventually hope that
the practice will eventually cease but to date have not felt that it was in
their interests to push the matter, especially since the United States is so
keen for the indigenous whaling to continue. The fear is that pushing the
issue may lead to a reopening of the moratorium debate. The preserva-
tionist states have focused on ensuring that the exception is not widened,
and to date they have been successful in this goal.'
XIV. WHALING SANCTUARIES
The provision of whale sanctuaries has been another critical battle-
ground between conservationists and preservationists. Preservationists
have attempted to widen the scope of the preservationist norm by advocat-
ing for sections of the high seas to be declared sanctuaries under Article
V of the ICRW.5  Pro-whaling states are just as determined to prevent
new sanctuaries bolstering the ban.535 There is a long history of such
sanctuaries being created by the IWC but the issue took on new significance
after the passing of the moratorium."6
2See Reeves, supra note 134, at 73.
5 See id. at 137-44; infra notes 583-87 and accompanying text.
534 See Rose, supra note 315, at 37.
5 See generally Shane Green, South Pacific Sanctuary Plan Sunk, SMH.COM.AU, available
at http'J/www.snih.com.au/articles/2002/05/21/1021882055438.html (last visited Dec. 17,
2008).
" Cassandra Phillips, Conservation in Practice: agreements, Regulations, Sanctuaries and
Action Plans, in THE CONSERVATION OF WHALES AND DOLPHINS 460 (Mark P. Simmonds
& Judith D. Hutchinson eds., Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1997). The IWC established
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A The Indian Ocean Sanctuary
With whale stocks approaching extinction for some species, pres-
ervationist-minded states proposed an old solution for an old problem:
sanctuaries. 37 In 1979 the ENGO-infiltrated Seychelles put forward to the
Scientific Committee a proposal for a sanctuary in the Indian Ocean, but
no consensus was reached despite it being the expressed opinion of several
neighboring countries that it was a good idea and that it satisfied the
criteria of being an area of ecological coherence."' Such a sanctuary, the
proposal argued, would enable breeding and other activities to be carried
out unhindered. 9 The Technical Committee, after debate as to the length
of the review period agreed, to a new paragraph to be inserted into the
schedule establishing a new Indian Ocean Sanctuary for an initial period of
ten years.' The region chosen has not traditionally been a commercial
whaling region, which is probably why whaling states (even Japan) agreed
to its implementation."l The sanctuary created has some flaws in that there
are no monitoring or enforcement provisions to oversee the initiative, but
it does exert a moral force that most states have accepted.5 2
Again in 1989, as the ten-year period was drawing to a close, the
Seychelles, supported by Australia, put forth a proposal that the Indian
Ocean Sanctuary created in 1979 should be extended for three years.' Both
Japan and Iceland were against the creation of any sanctuaries and Iceland
opposed the continuation of the sanctuary because few states bordering
the area were interested in the issue.' Many other states including France,
Spain, India, Antigua and Barbados, Oman, United Kingdom, Argentina,
one in the Southern Ocean (south of 40 degrees, between 160 degrees west and 70 degrees
west) in 1946, but it was really the same sanctuary set up in 1938 under the auspices of
the 1937 International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling. Id. Whalers accepted the
1946 sanctuary because the region quarantined was not considered economically viable
due to whales being scarce in the region. Id. However, when blue and fin whale stocks
became scarce, whaling states succeeded in convincing the IWC to rescind the sanctuary
status of the area and exploitation continued. Id.
57 See INTL WHALING COMM'N, supra note 306, at 34.
f Id. at 27.
539 Id.
540 Id. (16 votes for, 3 against and 3 abstentions).
41 See Rose, supra note 315, at 37.
542 id.
543 See INTL WHALING COMM'N, 40 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION, supra note 467, at 21.5" 1&
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Brazil, Mexico, the Netherlands and the United States supported the
proposal.S In the face of such strong support for the proposal, Japan and
Iceland agreed not to oppose the provision which was consequently ac-
cepted.' At the 1992 meeting it was agreed that the status of the sanctu-
ary would be reviewed every ten years."M 7 To date this area has retained
that status. 4
B. Southern Hemisphere Sanctuary
Emboldened by their success in achieving the Indian Ocean
Sanctuary, preservationist-minded states argued for the expansion of
whaling sanctuaries throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.5 49 The
Southern Hemisphere Sanctuary Plan for preservationist states, like
Australia, was the first step in preventing all the oceans from whaling.'
At the forty-fourth IWC meeting, France put forward a proposal that
a sanctuary be created in the Southern Hemisphere, but while many
members supported the gist of the proposal, most thought that it was
better to seek input from the Scientific Committee first.55' Japan believed
that such a motion was antithetical to the spirit and objectives of the
ICRW but the sanctuary proposal was supported by many IWC members as
falling within the ambit of the Convention.552 It was decided that any debate
would be deferred to the following meeting to allow the Scientific Committee
to more fully examine the idea. 3
At the forty-fifth meeting the IWC endorsed the concept of creating
a Southern Ocean Sanctuary, with Australia offering to hold an inter-
sessional, open-ended working group to address outstanding issues so that
a decision could be taken at the next meeting-Appendix 6 .5" At the forty-
sixth meeting the delegates, following from the decision taken the previous
year, voted to create a Southern Ocean Sanctuary for baleen and toothed
545 Id. at 22.
46 Id.547 See INT'L WHALING COMM'N, supra note 414.
"' See INTL WHALING COMM'N, 40 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION, supra note 467, at 21-22.
" See supra Part VIII.
0 See DARBY, supra note 387, at 220.
551 See INTL WHALING COMM'N, 43 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION, supra note 467, at 41-48.
552Id.
55
3 Id. at 41-48.
554See INT'L WHALING COMM'N, supra note 414, at 32.
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whales, to be reviewed in ten years.555 The creation of the Southern Ocean
Sanctuary was resisted strenuously by Japan, which attempted to "stack"
the IWC with small states to influence the vote.5 Norway argued that
doing so was contrary to the ICRW, and Japan attempted to utilize conser-
vationist arguments that such resources should not be denied to future
generations. Their arguments went unheeded.557
Phillips argues that the key factor in building support for the sanc-
tuary was the discovery in November 1993 that the Soviet whaling fleet had
been consistently underreporting its catch figures. 58 These revelations,
made just prior to the Norfolk Island meeting in February 1994, showed
that whalers had been ignoring IWC directives. This undercut the argument
that whalers could be trusted to regulate their activities.559 This revelation
was so morally shocking to the other states that it proved to be a critical
factor in the successful vote to create a whale sanctuary in the region in May
1994.560
Japan was not prepared to concede defeat, however. It lodged an
objection and thus can still legally hunt minke whales in the region as
well as continue to and try to eliminate the sanctuary exception.5 61 At
the fiftieth meeting, Japan, Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St.
Vincent, and the Grenadines proposed a resolution to abolish the Southern
Ocean Sanctuary, but it was declared out of order.6 2 At the fifty-first
meeting Japan attempted to lift the prohibition on hunting minke whales
in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary; the motion was defeated.5 " The United
States argued that the robust nature of the minke whale population was not
a factor in determining the validity of the sanctuary.5 '
55 See INT'L WHALING COMM'N, 45 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION, supra note 467, at 28. The vote result was 23 in favor, 1 against, and 6
abstentions. Id.
' See Phillips, supra note 535, at 460.
557 See INT'L WHALING COMM'N, 45 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION, supra note 467, at 28.
'5 See Phillips, supra note 535, at 461. The Soviet whaling fleet from 1948 to 1973 reported
taking a mere 2710 Humpback Whales, but it was later revealed by Russia that the real
take was over 48,000. See Caron, supra note 236, at 171.
... See Phillips, supra note 535, at 461.
o See Caron, supra note 236, at 172.
' See Rose, supra note 315, at 37-38.
562 See INT'L WHALING COMM'N, 49 ANNuAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION, supra note 467, at 28.
5 See INT'L WHALING COMM'N, 50 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION, supra note 467, at 10 (9 votes in favor, 22 against and 1 abstention).
W id.
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At the fifty-third meeting Japan changed its strategy and attempted
to modify the Southern Ocean Sanctuary by amending the schedule to state
that any prohibition would be applied if so advised by the Scientific Commit-
tee. The amendment was not passed.' At the fifty-sixth IWC meeting
Japan again tried to have the Southern Ocean Sanctuary abolished but
was not able to get the required three-quarter majority.5" However, Japan
seems determined to continue raising the issue until it is successful.
The creation of the Southern Hemisphere Sanctuary represents a
highwater mark in the attempt to preserve whales through the mechanism
of sanctuaries." 7 Since the late 1990s, a proposed South Pacific Sanctuary,
put forth by Australia and New Zealand, has not received a three-quarters
majority, nor has a joint proposal by Brazil and Argentina to create a
South Atlantic Whale Sanctuary been successful.5" The fact that the
sanctuaries were meant to be temporary is significant in that preser-
vationist states have managed to have their sanctuary status continued
indefinitely in the face of contrary scientific advice.5"9 At the moment there
appears to be a normative deadlock with neither group able to expand
their sphere of influence. At both the 2006 and 2007 meetings, proposals for
a new sanctuary in the South Atlantic were defeated without going to a
vote.5 70 A Japanese motion at the 2006 meeting to abolish the Southern
Ocean Sanctuary was defeated again and was not raised at the 2007
565 See INT'L WHALING COMM'N, 51 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION, supra note 467, at 17 (13 votes for, 23 against and 1 abstention).
'66 See INT'L WHALING COMM'N, supra note 429, at 46-47 (19 for, 30 against, and 2
abstentions).
" See INTL WHALING COMM'N, 52 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION, supra note 467, at 18-19.
568 See INT'L WHALING COMM'N, 51 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION, supra note 467, at 15-17; INTL WHALING COMM'N, 52 ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION, supra note 467, at 17-19; INT'L WHALING
COMM'N, 53 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION, supra note
417, at 19; INT'L WHALING COMM'N, 54 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION, supra note 417, at 33-34; INT'L WHALING COMM'N, supra note 429, at 48-50.
9 In The Age newspaper, Andrew Darby cited a report being prepared by scientists for
the 2004 IWC meeting in Sorento, Italy which argues that the creation of the Southern
Ocean Sanctuary was not ecologically justified since it did not conform to the principles
of marine reserve design, nor did it protect the whale's habitat. Rather, the sanctuaries
were a political and social compromise, not based on any hard scientific data. Andrew
Darby, Scientists Attack Whale Sanctuary, THE AGE, July 13, 2004, at 5, available at
http'/www.theage.com.au/articles/2004107/13/1089484316355.html?from=storylhs (last
visited Nov. 29, 2008).
570 See INVL WHALING COMM'N, supra note 429, at 34-36; INTL WHALING COMM'N, supra
note 226, at 4.
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meeting.571 At the 2008 Chile meeting, Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa
were planned to again call for the creation of a South Atlantic Sanctuary.572
However, in a spirit of amity they did not, citing that they did not wish to
call for a vote on the issue while ongoing negotiations were occurring on the
future of the IWC.5 73
CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly the whaling moratorium has had a positive effect in
terms of reversing decades of exploitation and allowing whale stocks to re-
cover.574 However, the question of how entrenched the norm of preservation
has become is the subject of fierce debate amongst researchers in the
field.575 It is clear that for the moment preservationist norms are ascendant
and that most members of the IWC favor the total extinction of the whaling
industry.576 Utilizing Legro's test for the robustness of the norm, it is observ-
able that as to specificity, the commercial moratorium is reasonably under-
stood and adhered to. However, the exemptions allowing for scientific and
aboriginal subsistence whaling complicate the operation of the ban.577 The
vexed anomaly of aboriginal whaling continues, and given the ENGOs'
571 See INTL WHALING COMM'N, supra note 429, at 36-37 (28 votes for, 33 against with 4
abstentions).
672 Press Release, Intl Whaling Comm'n, Details for The International Whaling Commission's
60th annual meeting in Chile 2008: Day 4 (June 26, 2008), available at http://www
.iwoffice.org/meetings/meeting2008.htm (last visited on Nov. 29, 2008).573 Id.
574 See INTL WHALING COMM'N, 49 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION, supra note 467, at 3. At the fiftieth meeting, Dr. Peter Bridewater, past
Australian Chairman, noted that in the past decade there had been a recovery in the
population of most whale species. Id.
17' Kristin Fletcher maintains that since the moratorium, the IWC is split between pres-
ervationists and conservationists and has become a forum merely to air grievances. See
Fletcher, supra note 370, at 226. However, most researchers agree that preservationism
is now dominant within the IWC. For example, Victor argues that preservationist values
are now pervasive, and combined with the global public losing a taste for whale products,
this means there is no need to alter IWC; rather, Victor believes evolving norms are bring-
ing about reform. See Victor, supra note 108, at 294. IAmato and Chopra argue that, due
to the efforts of the ENGOs. we can now speak of"an emergent entitlement of whales-not
just 'on behalf of whales-to a life of their own." See D'Amato and Chopra, supra note
79, at 23.576 See Victor, supra note 108, at 292.577 See Stroud, supra note 115, at 76. Since the moratorium was put in place, there are esti-
mates that over 14,000 whales have been killed under the guise of aboriginal whaling,
commercial kills, pirates and scientific whaling. Chris Stroud argues that the moratorium
has never been honored by some whaling states. Id.
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reluctance to tackle the issue, there is no sign of the practice being limited
or annulled.578 While Japan is the only state still continuing "scientific
research" on whales, such Japanese research seems set to continue for the
foreseeable future.579
The issue of the durability of the norm is also complicated. While the
moratorium has been in effect for over twenty years, the question of its
continuation has been revisited on a yearly basis at the IWC annual
meeting.' ° While there have been violations of the preservationist norm by
states like Japan and Norway, the majority of states do, at present,
accept the ban as legitimate. As Stoett acknowledges, "It may be argued
that there is sufficient normative consensus to maintain the present non-
consumptive philosophic outlook in the IWC and the broader whaling
regime."5"' Other researchers such as Vogler are not so sure, arguing
that the failure of the Irish proposal and the RMP threatens the long-term
survival of the moratorium.582
Delegate numbers are still finely balanced.5" Both sides seek to
attract new numbers supporting their respective positions.5" Japan still
targets poor states wanting for foreign aid, with Mali and Kiribati recently
joining under expectations to support conservationist measures.8 5 Those
seeking to maintain the ban have recruited the Czech Republic and Slovakia
to bolster their numbers.' However, overturning the moratorium requires
a three-quarters majority of members. This seems unlikely in the near fu-
ture, given how faction numbers are so evenly balanced. 7
At recent meetings Japan has been unable to advance its position
significantly at the IWC, despite being confident initially of success; it has
found that the proxy states which receive Japanese aid do not always vote
5. See generally Stroud, supra note 115.
... See supra Part VIII.580 id.
581 See STOETr, supra note 102, at 132-37.
s See VOGLER, supra note 105, at 55.
5' Andrew Darby, Stormy Seas for Migaloo and Friends, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD,
Apr. 20, 2005, at 14.5
4Id.
585 Id.
5 Id. In the last few years, Panama has rejoined while Morocco, Gabon, Mongolia,
Republic of Palau, Portugal, San Marino, Mauritania, Hungary, Tuvalu, Cote d'Ivoire,
Belgium, and Suriname have all become IWC members. See INTLWHALING COMM'N, IWC
MEMBERsAND COMMISSIONERS, available at http/www.iwcoffice.org/commission/members
.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2008).
5 7 Agence France-Presse ("AFP"), Hunters Push to Harpoon Whaling Ban, THE AUSTRAILAN,
July 20, 2004, at 8.
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for Japanese positions at the IWC.' Consequently, Japan seems to be
losing faith in the process altogether. When asked to vote at the 2007 IWC
meeting, Japan called out that they would "not participate," and it threat-
ened to quit the 1WC and to set up an alternative organization based on
sustainable utilization. 89 Despite this threat, they still attended the
2008 meeting, perhaps hoping to use the talks on the future of the IWC to
advance their cause.5"
The issue of concordance is also not settled since not all states
agree with preservationist ideals, such as Japan, Norway, and Iceland.
591
Proponents of preservationism do not dare make arguments with pres-
ervationist language because they know they will not succeed, so they
strategically couch their claims in conservationist rhetoric instead.59 2 Since
both sides use such rhetoric it can appear to an outsider that the points of
contention are small. However, the philosophical gulf between the two sides
is much greater than the formal rhetoric, which suggests that it is highly
unlikely that there will be any increase in concordance over core treaty
norms in the near future. Taking the three factors of specificity, durabil-
ity, and concordance into account, we can only speak of the norm being of
medium-to-high commonality.
Some states are pessimistic about the acceptance of the morato-
rium. 93 They argue that a whaling regime that does not include the major
whaling states is futile and that it might be better to relax the ban.594
"' Peter Alford, Japan's Whaling Friends a No-Show, THE AUSTRALIAN, June 21, 2005, at
5. At the 2005 IWC meeting in Ulsan, South Korea, Japan appeared to have the numbers
to overturn crucial votes. However, three of the putative pro-whaling states-Nauru, Togo
and Gambia-failed to present themselves for crucial votes. Id. As a result, pro-whaling
states lost all the contested votes, including failing to block progress on new whale
sanctuaries (new non-whaling zones in the South Pacific and South Atlantic) and on
conservation and animal welfare items. It is unclear if this was a strategic blunder on
behalf of these states or a deliberate policy to avoid offending anti-whaling forces. Id. In
2006, the meeting appeared set for a showdown since it seemed that the whalers had
enough members (a simple majority) to push the IWC in a conservationist direction. The
first test was over the meeting's agenda. Japan started by proposing to eliminate debate
on small cetaceans but surprisingly lost the vote (30-32-1). INT'L WHALING COMM'N, supra
note 441.
9 See DARBY, supra note 387, at 245-46.
o See Press Release, Intl Whaling Comm'n, Details for the International Whaling
Commission's 60th Annual Meeting in Chile: Day 3 (June 25, 2008), available at http://
www.iwcoffice.org/meetings/meeting2008.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2008).5
"
1 See supra Parts VIII, IX, X.
592 See supra Parts II, IX, XI.
593 See DESOMBRE, supra note 87, at 149-50.59 Id. at 173.
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However, Friedheim argues that we can observe within the whaling
regime that "the preservation norm has gone through a tipping point' and
has 'cascaded' throughout the world community, and all that needs to be
done is to have it 'internalised' by the peoples and governments of the
world."595
Friedheim's analysis is mostly correct, but he fails to understand
that many states have already internalized the preservationist norm. States
such as Australia, France, the Netherlands, and the United States appear
to have internalized preservationist values as part of their state identities,
and as a consequence they have become powerful norm proponents.5" While
preservationist proponents may not yet have brought about a universal
shift sufficient to end the normative debate they have been remarkably
successful in a relatively short period of time in changing how whales and
the practice of whaling are perceived globally.597 ENGOs have shown them-
selves to be adept at conducting public education campaigns.59 If
preservationist mores are to become more deeply entrenched in the 1WC
then these leading norm teachers need to focus on domestic populaces in the
recalcitrant states and need to suggest to their citizens that preserving
whales is not an insult to traditional customs and practices but rather is a
sign of a culture's maturity. Otherwise the normative deadlock at the IWC
will continue for the foreseeable future.
... Robert L. Friedheim, Introduction: The 1WC as a Contested Regime, in TOWARDS A
SUSTAINABLE WHALING REGIME 9 (Robert L. Friedheim ed., University of Washington
Press, 2001).
... DeSombre provides an example of how deeply the norm has been internalized in a
speech by the UK delegate at the fiftieth IWC meeting. The delegate stated, "We do not
believe that any whaling is justified," adding that he desired "the introduction of a
permanent, comprehensive moratorium on all whaling other than aboriginal subsistence
whaling." DeSombre, supra note 87, at 172-73.597 See STOE'rr, supra note 102, at 135.
198 See WHALES NEED US COALITION, U.S. NGO POLICY STATEMENTAGAINST COMMERCIAL
AND SCIENTIFIC WHALING, available at httpJ/whalesneedus.org/ (last visited Nov. 29,
2008); Press Release, Int'l Whaling Comm'n, Details for The International Whaling
Commission's 60th annual meeting in Chile: Day 3 (June 25, 2008), available at
httpJ/www.iwoffice.org/meetings/meeting2008.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2008).
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